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[1]  As the United States’ national pastime, baseball has taught valuable 
lessons to generations of Americans.  For example, players often learn 
how to be good teammates, how to set goals, and how to exercise 
discipline.  Baseball has other important life lessons to share as well such 
as the value of “chemistry.”  Chemistry is that intangible quality that 
allows individual players, each with a differing skill set and personal 
agenda, to work together and propel the team forward.  It is what makes a 
team, a team.  
 
[2]  Consider the following situation.  The best player on the team, the 
shortstop, has been injured.  The only player currently on the bench is left-
handed.  What are the coach’s options?  The first option involves the 
coach making the changes necessary to move the players to their “logical” 
positions.  For example, the coach could move the third baseman, the 
team’s second best fielder, to the shortstop position.  He could then move 
his able-bodied first baseman to third base, a position with which he has 
some experience.  Finally, he could put the left-handed player at first base, 
a position suitable for left-handed players.  This series of “logical” 
changes to the defensive line-up has filled the void of shortstop.  Because 
                                                 
*
 J.D. Anticipated (University of Florida, December 2007); Ph.D. (University of Florida, 
2004); B.A. (College of the Holy Cross, 1998). The Author thanks her family for their 
constant love and support, and particularly, her husband, whose patience and 
understanding allows the author to pursue all her passions. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 1 
 
 2
the coach avoided the potentially awkward placement of a left-handed 
player at shortstop, the first option seems like a good choice.  Then there is 
the second option, in which the coach could simply allow the left-handed 
player to fill the void at shortstop.  
 
[3]  Although both options accomplish the task of replacing the injured 
shortstop, is one option better than the other?  Which option should the 
coach choose?  Most baseball aficionados instantly recognize that a left-
handed player at shortstop is an awkward fit.  For example, the throw 
across the diamond is more difficult for a left-handed player than it is for a 
right-handed player, and it is more difficult for a left-handed player to 
protect the middle of the field.  The first option prevents this awkwardness 
while the second option embraces it.  At first glance, the first option 
appears to be the best choice.  
 
[4]  However, for others – those who have studied the game of baseball – 
the second option is the preferred choice.  Why?  It is the option that 
provides the greatest number of players with an opportunity to be 
successful.  As a coach, you must consider the role of each player on the 
field and how those players interact with one another.  While the coach 
might be able to substitute the skill set of the injured shortstop, he is 
unlikely to replicate the injured shortstop’s comfort level.  His feel for the 
game.  His experience.  For example, he is familiar with that part of the 
field and can predict how the players in his immediate vicinity will react 
to certain conditions.  He is accustomed to watching the batter from that 
position.  He knows where he is supposed to be on any given play and 
understands the expectations and demands of his position.  He has made 
the plays before.  Armed with this knowledge, experience, and a sense of 
comfort, a player has the greatest chance for success.  Now, which option 
should the coach chose?  
 
[5]  In many ways, Congress is the coach of Team Patent.  Congress must 
ensure that the attorneys, inventors, agents, and examiners that comprise 
Team Patent have the best opportunity to succeed.  Under the current 
“first-to-invent” patent system, each player knows the rules of the game.   
Each player knows how to prepare for the game and what to expect from 
his teammates.  The players are comfortable in their respective roles.  Like 
any other team, Team Patent will perform well on some days and stumble 
on others.  Nevertheless, this team is successful.  Any massive change to 
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the team’s infrastructure jeopardizes the team’s likelihood of success.  The 
threat to the team’s chemistry – that intangible quality that distinguishes 
the good from the great – intensifies.  
 
[6]  Congress is under increasing pressure to reform the rules of the game 
by which Team Patent plays.  These changes to the rules have been 
described as “the most sweeping reforms to this country’s patent laws in at 
least 50 years.”1  Like any good coach, Congress must take the course of 
action that least disturbs Team Patent’s game.  The comfort level of Team 
Patent cannot be jeopardized because doing so diminishes the likelihood 
of its success.  Too many deviations from what Team Patent expects from 
the game will yield a box score of trouble. 
 
PART I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
 
[7]  The primary purpose of the American patent system is to advance the 
arts and sciences.2  During the 1941 hearings of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee,3 the Commissioner of Patents summarized the 
system by stating that “[t]he individual reward is only the lure to bring 
about this much broader objective.  Every patent granted benefits society 
by adding to the sum total of human knowledge . . . .”4  In this regard, the 
United States distinguishes itself from all other nations with its unique 
adherence to the first-to-invent patent system. 
 
                                                 
1
 Steven B. Kelber, Bill Has Issues All Will Debate, NAT’L L.J. Aug. 29, 2005. 
2
 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchem. Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945). 
3
 Alfred W. Knight, The Patent System, 6 ALUMNI REV. 16 (1943).  At President 
Roosevelt’s suggestion, Congress established the Temporary National Economic Meeting 
(“TNEC”) in 1938.  The President recommended a thorough investigation of the 
“concentration of economic power in American industry and the effect of that 
concentration upon the decline of competition.” The TNEC hearings were diverse, 
covering subjects ranging from monopolies to patents to advanced technology.  The 
hearings generated forty-three volumes of published reports.  The final report was 
published in 1941 and was swiftly followed by the American entry into World War II; an 
event that was far more significant than any other factor in finally bringing the Great 
Depression to an end.  
4
 Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 331 (quoting Commissioner Coe’s testimony before the TNEC 
hearings). 
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[8]  The first-to-invent and the first-to-file patent systems represent two 
different ideologies for determining which inventor is entitled to a patent 
when multiple applicants claim the same subject matter.  According to the 
first-to-invent system, the inventor who establishes that he made the 
invention in this country before another, and did not abandon, suppress, or 
conceal it, will acquire superior rights over all later inventors.5  The named 
inventors in subsequently filed applications receive nothing.  This “all-or-
nothing” approach raises the concern that patents may “grant[] property 
rights beyond what inventors legally deserve, or (of more fundamental 
concern) beyond what best promotes the development and dissemination 
of technological products.”6 
 
[9]  Conversely, the first-to-file system rewards the filing of an application 
over inventorship.  Priority is determined by the first application filed with 
the patent office rather than by the first individual to conceive of the 
invention.7  First-to-file systems often recognize the rights of prior users 
by awarding compulsory licenses to those applicants who were practicing 
or developing the same claimed invention but were not the first applicant 
to file.8 
 
[10]  In recent years, the pressure to overhaul the American patent system 
has increased.  The number of proposed reforms is extensive.  Among the 
                                                 
5
 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).  
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (g)(1) during the course 
of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291, another 
inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 
104, that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was 
made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or 
concealed, or (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention 
was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed it.  In determining priority of invention under 
this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates 
of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the 
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce 
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
6
 John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural 
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 105 (2001). 
7
 Gary L. Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior User Rights – A Necessary Part of a First-
to-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1993). 
8
 Id. at 570-71. 
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most controversial of these proposed reforms is the abandonment of the 
current first-to-invent system in favor of the widely adopted first-to-file 
system.  As explained by one scholar, the impetus for these proposed 
changes arises because “[t]he first-inventor system works too slowly, at 
too great a cost, with too much complexity, and with too many 
uncertainties to serve best the needs of a technologically advanced 
nation.”9  The drive for global patent harmonization is gaining momentum 
as Congress continues to amend American patent laws to conform to 
international treaties and standards.  However, its unique adherence to the 
first-to-invent system prevents the United States’ participation in certain 
global discussions. 
 
[11]  The American first-to-invent patent system traces its roots directly to 
the Constitution of the United States.10  Notwithstanding the current 
system’s flaws, the United States continues to “dominate[] the rest of the 
world in innovation, to the point that in almost every field of industry 
today the technology is based largely on inventions which originated in 
the United States.”11  Although each patent system has its advantages and 
disadvantages, abandoning the first-to-invent system in favor of the first-
to-file system will decrease the quality of patents and increase the costs of 
patent litigation.  Of greater importance, it will violate the Constitution.  
The uncertainties associated with the adoption of a first-to-file system in 
the United States are numerous and unsettling. 
 
[12]  This paper rejects the adoption of the first-to-file system.  Patent 
reform should only proceed bit-by-bit.  Hence, this paper encourages 
Congress to slowly and incrementally implement any necessary reforms.  
The abandonment of the first-to-invent system in favor of the first-to-file 
system is not prudent and should therefore be considered only as a last 
resort.  Part II of this paper introduces the reader to the origins of the 
                                                 
9
 The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992: J. Hearings on H.R. 4978 and S.2605 Before 
the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the H. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration, 102d Cong. (1992) 
(statement of Robert A. Armitage, Vice President, Corporate Patents and Trademarks, 
The Upjohn Company, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers) 
[hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearings]. 
10
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
11
 Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 779, 779-80 (1991). 
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American patent system, from its roots in the English Statute of 
Monopolies to its codification in the Constitution.  Part III discusses the 
current American first-to-invent patent system.  Part IV familiarizes the 
reader with the proposed first-to-file system.  Part V details both the 
domestic and international calls for reform of the American first-to-invent 
system.  Part VI argues against the adoption of the first-to-file system.  
Part VII addresses suggestions for potential reform and Part VIII 
concludes the paper.  
 
PART II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 
 
[13]  Although the Constitution formally established the American patent 
system, the system’s roots reach back for centuries and across the Atlantic 
Ocean.12  When determining whether to provide constitutional authority 
enabling Congress to grant patent monopolies, the framers of the 
Constitution considered three available sources of precedent.13  The most 
familiar of these sources, and therefore the most important, was the 
existing patent practice in England.14  Even before the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth I, the English Crown had granted monopolies.15  Such a 
monopoly granted to its holder the right to exclude others from 
manufacturing the item or practicing the invention.16  Furthermore, it 
conferred to the applicant the right to engage in those activities.17  Queen 
Elizabeth’s eventual abuse of the system, including her capricious 
conveyance of these exclusive rights, precipitated strong judicial and 
                                                 
12
 See generally, Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States 
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697 (1994). 
13
 Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10 (1994).  These three precedents were:  1) the 
existing patent practice in Great Britain; 2) the colonial practice of granting “patents”; 
and 3) the patent-granting practices of various states during the Confederacy. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1119, 1143 (2000). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
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statutory actions against monopolies.18  In its 1601 session, which has 
been described as “the most significant in English constitutional history,” 
Parliament commenced a struggle to overcome Queen Elizabeth’s royal 
prerogative.19  Although Queen Elizabeth staved off a statutory prohibition 
against granting such monopolies,20 she was not as successful in 
controlling the will of the judiciary.21 
 
[14]  English courts generally believed that monopolies were illegal.  
Monopolies were detrimental to “the liberty of the subject” because they 
raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and reduced competition.22  
The judiciary solidified its position in Darcy v. Allein.23  In Darcy, the 
court voided a monopoly issued to a groom of the Queen's Privy Chamber 
for manufacturing playing cards.24  The court’s prohibition of monopolies, 
however, was not absolute.  The Darcy court carved out an exception for 
those situations in which an individual “by his own charge and industry, or 
by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm.” 25  In 
those circumstances, an individual might usefully be granted a monopoly. 
 
[15]  Many scholars believe that the Statute of Monopolies was the legal 
foundation for the English patent system.26  Twenty years after the Darcy 
decision, the Statute of Monopolies codified the general prohibition 
against monopolies.  Like the Darcy court, the statute also created an 
exception by granting patents for “new manufactures within this realm, to 
                                                 
18
 Id.  See also Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 853-54 (1994). 
19
 Id. at 865.  
20
 Id.  Walterscheid further noted that Queen Elizabeth hoped her subjects would not take 
away her royal prerogative, which she held as “the chiefest flower in her garden and 
principal and head pearl in her crown and diadem.” 
21
 Id. at 867. 
22
 Id. at 868. 
23
 Darcy v. Allein, (1620) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.) reprinted in MONOPOLY AND 
COMPETITION POLICY VOL. I, at 5-11 (F.M. Scherer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 
1993).    
24
 Id. 
25
 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 869. 
26
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 12. 
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the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures . . . .”27  
Several aspects of English patent practice were noteworthy.28  First, the 
grant of a patent was an exception to the Statute of Monopolies, an 
exception driven by an interest in public service.  Second, the Crown 
exercised complete discretion over the English patent practice, i.e., it was 
a royal prerogative.29  As such, these patent rights were protected by 
English common law notwithstanding the lack of a common law right to a 
patent.  Third, a patent monopoly enjoyed increasing importance as 
English industrial development expanded.30 
 
[16]  After the hostilities with Great Britain subsided, Americans renewed 
their interests in protecting intellectual property.31  On May 2, 1783, “[t]he 
earliest known venture of the United States Government into the realm of 
intellectual property” occurred when the Continental Congress issued a 
resolution encouraging the states to enact laws protecting copyright.32  In 
                                                 
27
 Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
[A]ny declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters 
patents and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, 
hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of 
new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making 
such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state . . . the same fourteen 
years to be accounted from the date of the first letters patents or grant 
of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of 
such force as they should be if this act had never been made, and of 
none other.  Id. 
28
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 13. 
29
 WILLIAM M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO PATENT PRIVILEGES 
FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 3 (1846) (explaining that “inventors are never entitled 
as of right to letters patent, granting them the sole use of their inventions, but they must 
obtain them from the Crown by petition, and as a matter of grace and favour . . . .”) 
(emphasis in original). 
30
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 14. 
31
 Id. at 17. 
32
 Id. at 20. The resolution stated:  
That it be recommended to the several states, to secure to the authors or 
publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the 
United States, and to their . . . executors, administrators and assigns, the 
copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than fourteen years 
from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall 
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1784, South Carolina responded to this recommendation by enacting a 
copyright law.33  This law, however, failed to provide the administrative 
procedures required for its successful implementation.34  Eleven other 
states enacted general copyright laws between 1783 and 1786,35 but not 
one state attempted to enact a general patent statute.36  The lack of a 
general patent statute likely reflected the absence of mention by the 
Continental Congress in its May 1783 resolution.37 Notwithstanding the 
lack of federal Congressional encouragement, the states independently 
attempted to provide inventors with some exclusive rights of limited 
duration.38  However, by early 1787, the defects in this individualistic 
state-driven approach to patent protection were evident.  Most notably, 
because a state could only legislate within its geographical boundaries, it 
could only protect patent rights within its borders.39  There was a lack of 
uniformity in the protection of intellectual property.  To prevent 
infringement in neighboring states under this fragmented approach, a 
patent holder was forced to secure patents in multiple states,40 which was a 
difficult and expensive process.  Additionally, as states occasionally 
revoked a previously issued patent, a patent was not an absolute guarantee 
                                                                                                                         
survive the term first mentioned, and to their . . . executors, 
administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another 
term of time not less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right 
of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the 
original authors, or publishers, or . . . their executors, administrators 
and assigns, by such laws and under restrictions as to the several states 
may seem proper.  Id. n.63 (omissions in original).   
33
 Id. at 16.  
34
 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 93 
(1967) (noting that the grant of each patent required a special act by the legislature). 
35
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 21. 
36
 See generally BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 110-22.  Six of these enactments occurred in 
1783, with three states – Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland – actually preceding 
the congressional resolution.  Only Delaware failed to comply with the congressional 
recommendation.  Scholars presume that lack of a similar attempt to provide patent 
protection likely reflected the absence of mention by the Continental Congress’ May 
1783 resolution. 
37
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 20. 
38
 Id. at 22. 
39
 Id.  
40
 See id.  Each patent granted required its own independent legislative act. 
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of protection.41  As one observer of the time concluded, “a patent can be of 
no use unless it is from Congress, and not from them till they are vested 
with much more authority than they possess at this time.”42 
 
[17]  When the Constitutional Convention convened in May of 1787, only 
one document of record referenced the subject matter that ultimately 
comprised Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (the 
Intellectual Property Clause).43  Apparently, the states did not instruct their 
delegates to seek patent (or copyright) protection in the evolving 
Constitution.44  The closest expression of concern for protection of 
intellectual property surfaced in April of 1787, when Virginia delegate 
James Madison noted that among the weaknesses of the existing 
Confederation was a “want of concert in matters [between state 
governments] where common interest requires it.”45  But compared to the 
deplorable loss of “national dignity, interest, and revenue,” Madison 
considered “want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization & 
literary property” to be “[i]nstances of inferior moment.”46  
 
[18]  Evidence of debate or discussion regarding the Intellectual Property 
Clause at the Constitutional Convention is lacking as not one delegate to 
the Constitutional Convention left any record concerning the interpretation 
or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause.47  Nevertheless, 
Thomas Jefferson captured the overwhelming sentiment of the time.  He 
                                                 
41
 See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (discussing how on 
March 19, 1787, New York granted a patent to steamboat inventor John Fitch for 
exclusive use of steamboats on all waterways in that jurisdiction, and that more than 
eleven years later, New York revoked Fitch’s patent and awarded it to Robert R. 
Livingstone for twenty years).  
42
 BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 90 (quoting Letter from F. W. Geyer to Silas Deane (May 
1, 1787)). 
43
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
44
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 24. 
45
 BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 125 (noting that James Madison “unburdened himself on 
paper” regarding the weaknesses of the Confederation by a cataloging list of its defects). 
46
 Id. 
47
 See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers 
Include It With Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992). 
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noted that “monopolies [] are justly classed among the greatest nuisances 
in Government . . . [because] [m]onopolies are sacrifices of the many to 
the few.  Where the power is in the few, it is natural for them to sacrifice 
the many to their own partialities and corruptions.”48  Virginian George 
Mason echoed Jefferson’s sentiments.  Mason refused to sign the proposed 
Constitution because he believed that an earlier draft gave Congress the 
power to “grant monopolies in trade and commerce.”49 
 
[19]  Despite this general opposition to monopolies, the framers knew that 
patents were different.  Yes, patents were technically monopolies, but they 
were of a more favorable and beneficial variety.50  To ensure that patent 
rights were granted to inventors for a limited time, the framers chose to 
expressly grant this power to Congress.51  Unlike any other constitutional 
grant of Congressional power, the Intellectual Property Clause provides an 
explicit statement of the framers’ legislative intent – “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts.”52 
 
[20]  This explicit statement of legislative intent led to speculation as to 
the statement’s purpose.  One scholar suggested, “this power of Congress 
was enumerated . . . for the purpose of expressing its limitations.”53  
Others believed the Intellectual Property Clause forced Congress to 
exercise this enumerated power in a very particular way.54  Two findings 
support the latter assertion.  First, the framers rejected other attempts to 
grant Congress similar special powers.55  Second, by the time the 
                                                 
48
 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 LETTERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES at 427 
(William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall eds., 1884) (1865). 
49
 See Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 55. 
50
 Id. at 38. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. at 32-33. 
53
 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 486 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1953).  Crosskey suggests 
that “[r]eading the power, then, in light of the [S]tatute of Anne and the then recent 
decisions of the English courts, it is clear that this power of Congress was enumerated in 
the Constitution, for the purpose of expressing its limitations.” (emphasis in original).  
54
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 33. 
55
 Id.   
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Constitutional Convention began, the colonists had utilized a variety of 
means, other than the grant of a patent, to promote scientific and artistic 
progress.56 
 
[21]  When the discussion of enumerated congressional powers began on 
August 16, 1787, the draft Constitution did not refer to inventors, patents, 
authors, or copyrights.57  However, just a short time later, the power “[t]o 
encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful 
knowledge and discoveries; [t]o grant patents for useful inventions” was 
among twenty additional powers “proposed to be vested in the Legislature 
of the United States . . . .”58  Although the identity of the delegate who 
introduced this proposed power is unknown, James Madison and Charles 
Pinckney are the likely candidates.59  On August 18, 1787, both men 
submitted proposals to the Committee on Detail.60  Although the 
committee then issued a partial report on August 22, 1787, it said nothing 
                                                                                                                         
Jefferson's dinner conversation of March 11, 1798 supports this 
observation: Baldwin mentions at table the following fact. When the 
bank bill was under discussion in the House of Representatives, Judge 
Wilson came in, and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him 
of the following fact which passed in the grand convention. Among the 
enumerated powers given to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It 
was, on debate, struck out. Several particular powers were then 
proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress a 
power to establish a national bank . . . . This was rejected, as was every 
other special power, except that of giving copyrights to authors, and 
patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled 
down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.   
Id. n.107 (emphasis in original) (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 375-76 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)). 
56
 Id. at 33 n.108.  By the time the Constitutional Convention convened, the other types 
of rewards included but were not limited to awarding medals, honorary titles, premiums, 
and bounties. 
57
 Id. at 44. 
58
 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321-22 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
59
 See Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 50.  Walterscheid suggested that “Madison’s 
subsequent defense of the Intellectual Property Clause, while not conclusive, suggests 
that he had more than a passing interest in this particular clause.” (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (“The utility of this 
power will scarcely be questioned.”)).  Id. n.172. 
60
 Id. at 50. 
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about intellectual property.61  Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Eleven 
unanimously adopted the Intellectual Property Clause in its current form.62  
The lack of recorded debate or discussion regarding the Intellectual 
Property Clause has prompted some scholars to surmise that the framers 
attempted only “to clarify, [rather] than to change, the existing law.”63 
 
[22]  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution reads, 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”64  In addition to imposing specific 
limitations on subject matter, scope, and duration, the Intellectual Property 
Clause provides Congress with its legislative intent.65  Because “[e]very 
patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public,” the 
framers restricted the congressional grant of patent monopolies to 
circumstances in which progress of science and the useful arts could be 
promoted.66  “Patents serve a higher end– the advancement of science.  An 
invention need not be [ ] startling . . . [b]ut [ ] has to be of such quality and 
distinction that masters of the scientific field . . . will recognize it as an 
advance.”67 
                                                 
61
 Id. 
62
 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 508-10 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  The vote occurred on September 5, 1787.  It was called the Committee of Eleven 
because Rhode Island never sent any delegates to the Convention and New York could 
not vote because its delegation was absent.  Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 50.  
63
 CROSSKEY, supra note 53, at 477.  The clause was adopted on September 5, 1787 after 
several months of intense and sometimes nasty debate on other issues.  However, 
according to Madison’s notes, the delegates approved the Intellectual Property Clause 
with neither discussion nor debate.  While many commentators believe that the lack of 
discussion regarding the clause signified universal agreement among the delegates 
regarding its purpose, others argue for an alternate interpretation.  In short, the delegates 
may have been too tired after such an exhausting summer to engage in a critical dialogue 
regarding the clause.  See also Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 26-27. 
64
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
65
 Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 31-32. 
66
 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
67
 Id. at 155. In Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883), Justice Bradley discussed 
the ramifications of a more lenient standard.  
“It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every 
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would 
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PART III. THE CURRENT AMERICAN FIRST-TO-INVENT PATENT SYSTEM 
 
[23]  When the Philippines adopted the first-to-file system on January 1, 
1998, the United States became the only country utilizing the first-to-
invent patent system.68  The American patent system is unique in that it 
embraces conception as the touchstone of inventorship.69  “The conception 
of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of 
the inventive act . . . [i]t is [ ] the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of 
a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention . . . 
..”
70
  In the American patent system, four factors determine the priority of 
invention: 1) the place of invention, 2) the date of conception, 3) the date 
of reduction to practice, and 4) the diligence of the inventor from the date 
of conception to the date of reduction to practice.71  
                                                                                                                         
naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator 
in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate 
creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to 
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who 
make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, 
and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable 
them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without 
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It 
embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and 
apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits 
and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.” 
68
 Perspective on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 
(2005) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, Former Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks). 
69
 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
see also Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897) (holding that 
conception requires the “complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act”). 
70
 Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276 (emphasis in original). 
71
 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).  Previously, a party seeking to prove a date of invention 
could not introduce evidence of inventive activity occurring in a foreign country.  
Following the implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement, 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2002) was amended to permit 
introduction of evidence of inventive activity occurring in any WTO member country.  
The amendment applied to all applications filed in the United States on or after January 1, 
1996.  See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2002). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 1 
 
 15
[24]  Because the formation of the complete idea is the core of the creative 
act,72 the filing of a patent application is not solely determinative of one’s 
right to obtain a patent. Professor Ned Conley explains the American first-
to-invent patent system as follows: 
Under our first-to-invent system, the inventor can be told 
that if he diligently proceeds to reduce his invention to 
practice he need not rush to file a patent application. 
Instead, he can wait until his invention is fully developed 
and he has determined that it will perform satisfactorily, 
thereby improving his chances for obtaining financing. He 
can also be told that delaying filing until the invention is 
fully developed will allow him to more fully describe his 
invention, thereby improving his chances of obtaining a 
patent which will protect commercially viable variations of 
his invention.73 
 
Because the first to-invent priority system rewards innovation, an 
inventor can make a choice and still find protection.74  A poorly financed 
inventor may choose to delay filing an application until the invention is 
fully developed.75  Under the current system, making this choice does not 
pose a significant risk of losing the exclusive right to the American 
patent.76  A more solvent inventor may choose to file provisional 
applications in this and other countries.77  As the invention matures, the 
inventor can file subsequent applications.  Most importantly, the inventor 
can be confident that the inventor has done everything allowed by the 
American patent system to gain an advantage in obtaining patent 
protection. 
 
[25]  Most critics of the first-to-invent system focus on the conflict that 
arises when two independent inventors assert inventorship of the same 
                                                 
72
 Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes – A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-
Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 759 (1998). 
73
 Conley, supra note 11, at 783. 
74
 Id. at 784. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id.  
77
 See 35 U.S.C. §119 (2002) (addressing the benefit of the earlier foreign filing date) 
and 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (addressing the benefit of the earlier American filing date). 
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claimed subject matter.  This conflict is referred to as a priority dispute.  
Because the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issues only 
one patent for the claimed subject matter of the invention,78 the PTO 
established a mechanism for resolving a priority dispute.79  This 
mechanism is known as an interference.  
 
[26]  The PTO may declare an interference whenever “an application is 
made for a patent which . . . would interfere with any pending application, 
or with any unexpired patent . . . .”80 The party with the earliest filing date 
is designated the “senior party” and all other parties are labeled “junior 
parties.” The junior party bears the burden of establishing priority of 
invention.81  Because “[p]riority of invention is a question of law to be 
determined based upon underlying factual determinations,”82 the parties 
must establish their asserted date of conception with corroborating 
evidence.83 
                                                 
78
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (providing “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added). 
79
 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1999); PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2300-2309 (2001) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
80
 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1952).  Alternatively, priority disputes may also arise in the context 
of an infringement action, where the accused infringer asserts that the plaintiff was not 
the first inventor.  See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (the defendant asserted that the invention had been known prior to the plaintiff's 
date of invention). Determining the date of “invention” is not restricted only to the 
activities of the alleged infringer and the patentee.  The alleged infringer may offer 
evidence that a unrelated third party had completed the invention prior to the patentee, 
thereby rendering the patentee’s invention invalid for want of novelty.  Id. 
81
 See Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the junior party 
bears the burden of proving prior conception and reduction to practice); Innovative Scuba 
Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
challenger bore the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence and 
that this burden remains with the challenger throughout the litigation). 
82
 Innovative Scuba, 26 F.3d at 1115. 
83
 See Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that 
“[c]onception must be proved by corroborating evidence which shows that the inventor 
disclosed to others his ‘complete thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those 
skilled in the art to make the invention.’” (quoting Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 
(Fed. Cir. 1985))).  
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[27]  Considering the low rate of incidence, interferences receive a 
disproportionate share of criticism.  For example, in Fiscal Year (FY) 
2005, a total of 409,532 patent applications were filed at the PTO,84 
bringing the total number of pending applications to 807,379.85  As of 
September 30, 2005, only 362 total applications were in interference.86 
These 362 applications in interference represent only 0.045% of all 
applications under examination.  The data for FY 2006 indicate that the 
number of interference proceedings has diminished.87  Despite the number 
of pending applications increasing by nearly 100,000, the PTO declared 
only two more interferences from FY 2005 to FY 2006.  
 
[28]  In fact, the number of declared interferences has been consistently 
steady and low over a prolonged period of time.  For example, the PTO 
received 3,151,901 total patent applications between 1983 and 2000.88  
During that time, there were 2,858 two-party decisions in interference 
cases.89  Using the total number of applications filed during that seventeen 
year span as the denominator, the number of two-party decisions was 
0.1% of the total applications filed.90  Similarly, using the number of 
patents granted as the denominator, the percentage of two-party decisions 
was still less than 0.2% of all patents granted.91  
 
[29]  Furthermore, in its Performance and Accountability Report for FY 
2005, the PTO highlighted the recent successes of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).  Specifically, the average pendency for 
                                                 
84
 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR 2005, 118 tbl.1 [hereinafter PTO FY 2005], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf. 
85
 Id. at 122 tbl.5. 
86
 Id. 
87
 As of September 2006, only 364 of the 905,869 pending applications were in 
interference.  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2006, 124 tbl.5 [hereinafter PTO FY 2006], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/2006annualreport.pdf. 
88
 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to 
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 427 (2002). 
89
 Id.  
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 1 
 
 18
interferences was less than twelve months.92  The PTO also reported that a 
final decision in over 80% of interferences was mailed within twenty-four 
months of declaration.93  That percentage escalated to over 90% in the FY 
2006.94  Similarly, the BPAI began development of “a full-scale electronic 
filing and information system for interferences” which will “lay the 
groundwork for the implementation of the proposed post-grant review 
proceedings that are currently planned to be conducted in the future at the 
Board . . . .”95  
 
PART IV. THE PROPOSED FIRST-TO-FILE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
[30]  To date, every patent-granting country other than the United States 
utilizes the first-to-file patent system.  A tremendous volume of work has 
been dedicated to the discussion and comparison of the two systems.96  
                                                 
92
 PTO FY 2005, supra note 84, at 25.  
93
 Id. 
94
 PTO FY 2006, supra note 87, at 23.  
95
 PTO FY 2005, supra note 84, at 25. 
96
 See generally Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File, Mandatory 
Reexamination, and Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas for Better? Or 
Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595 (1987); Coe A. Bloomberg, In 
Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (1993); Sean T. Carnathan, 
Patent Priority Disputes - A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. 
REV. 755 (1998); Conley, supra note 11; Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our 
Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 561 (1986); 
Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard 
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193 (1989); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The 
U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425 (2002); Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States Should 
Adopt the First-to-File System for Patents, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 797 (1991); Toshiko 
Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative 
Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2002); Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the 
United States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263 
(1995); Karen M. Curesky, Note, International Patent Harmonization Through W.I.P.O.: 
An Analysis of the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a “First-To-File” Patent System, 21 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 289 (1989); Vito J. DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of 
Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687 (1992-93); Stephanie Gore, Comment, “Eureka! But I Filed Too 
Late . . .”: The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293 (1993); Peter A. Jackman, Essay, Adoption of a First-to-File 
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Many believe the primary advantage of the first-to-file system is its 
administrative efficiency.97  Under this system, an accurate prior art search 
requires only an examination of the PTO database for pending and issued 
patents disclosing the same invention.  Furthermore, the deference to the 
act of filing will alleviate many of the long delays and uncertainties faced 
by inventors under the first-to-invent system.98  “[T]he question of right to 
a patent between interfering parties would be satisfied by a quick 
examination of filing dates, thus eliminating the need for interference 
proceedings.”99  Because the first-to-file system naturally dispenses with 
the “expense and complexities associated with trying to determine who 
invented first,”100 the resolution of a priority dispute “do[es] not involve 
complex proofs or extended proceedings.”101 
 
[31]  Many argue that this certainty of priority and the improvement in 
administrative efficiency will improve patent quality and decrease patent 
litigation.102 Proponents of the first-to-file system believe that using the 
filing date of a patent application is socially preferable to using the mental 
                                                                                                                         
Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67 (1997); Kim Taylor, Note, Patent 
Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First to File” Debate Continues, 20 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994). 
97
 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:36 (4th ed. 2006). 
98
 See Robert A. Armitage & Richard C. Wilder, Harmonization: Will it Resuscitate a 
Patent System Suffocating Its Small Entity Users with Cost and Complexity?, 1 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 116, 117 (1993) (explaining that under the current first-to-invent 
system, an inventor cannot be certain for some time that his application will go 
unchallenged). 
99
 Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now – The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 
N.C.J. INT’L. L. & COM. Reg. 291, 313 (1995). 
100
 Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent 
Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH. 
L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2006).  See also Perspectives on Patents: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law 
Association) (stating that according to AIPLA’s 2003 Economic Survey, the median cost 
necessary to complete the preliminary phase or discovery in a simple two-party 
interference is $113,000.  The cost through final resolution escalates to over $300,000.  
Furthermore, the all-inclusive cost for each party in interference was $600,000 in 2005, 
$302,000 in 2003, and was $201,000 in 2001). 
101
 MOY, supra note 97. 
102
 See Takenaka, supra note 96, at 654-55. 
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act of conception or the physical act of invention.103 Because a patent 
application ultimately matures into a public disclosure, the first-to-file 
system places the invention into society more quickly,104 thereby 
furthering the constitutional mandate of “promot[ing] the progress of 
science and useful arts . . . .”105 
 
[32]  Some commentators believe that the first-to-file system provides a 
fairness to smaller entities that is lacking in the first-to-invent system.  
Former Commissioner of Patents Gerald J. Mossinghoff summarized 
seventeen years of interference data from the PTO by concluding that the 
current first-to-invent system has not provided any advantage to small 
entities.106  Mossinghoff argued that the current first-to-invent system 
often forces a small entity into a financially burdensome interference with 
“a large and determined company” that filed subsequent to the small 
entity.107  Because the parties “are almost exclusively financially-
resourceful assignees,”108 the only choice for that small entity may be the 
abandonment of its application.  The mere threat of provoking expensive 
patent litigation may scare a small company away from either offering a 
new product or pursuing the development of one in the first place.109  This 
type of bullying is an “effective barrier to numerous ‘first’ inventors,”110 
and stifles, rather than promotes, innovation.111  In this way, large 
established companies with huge litigation resources are able to extract 
                                                 
103
 MOY, supra note 97.  See George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate - First-to-
Invent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L.J. 923, 925-26 (1967). 
104
 Curesky, supra note 96, at 296.  Currently, the pendency for the first office action is 
shortest for Technology Center 2800 – Semiconductor, Electrical, Optical Systems and 
Components (16.4 months) and longest for Technology Center 2100 – Computer 
Architecture, Software & Information Security (30.8 months).  Technology Center 2800 
has the shortest average pendency (25.4 months) while Technology Center 2100 has the 
longest average pendency (44.0 months). PTO FY 2006, at 123, tbl.4.  
105
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
106
 Mossinghoff, supra note 88, at 428. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Banner & McDonnell, supra note 96, at 607 (quoting ABA PTC Committee Report 
108 (1986)).  
109
 See, e.g., FRED WARSHOFSKY, PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD’S 
TECHNOLOGY 248-49 (1994). 
110
 Curesky, supra note 96, at 296. 
111
 WARSHOFSKY, supra note 109, at 245-71. 
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“blood money” from smaller companies with the mere threat of a patent 
suit.112 
 
[33]  Based on his empirical data, Mossinghoff advocated the adoption of 
the first-to-file system.113  He asserted that “small entities by their very 
nature can move more quickly than larger bureaucracies . . . [and]  by 
filing a complete technical disclosure . . . [small entities] can readily 
secure priority rights in a first-inventor-to-file system without a major 
expenditure of resources . . . .”114  According to Mossinghoff, a small 
entity can find relief in a provisional application.  Later, when the 
invention is more completely developed, the small entity can file a 
complete non-provisional application.115  Under the first-to-file system, 
the lure of procedural ease is substantial.  An individual inventor can be 
taught to file an early application more easily than the inventor can be 
trained to maintain the quantity and quality of records necessary to prevail 
in a priority dispute under the current first-to-invent system. 
 
[34]  Interestingly, the first-to-file system does not necessarily value filing 
over inventorship, but rather, it emphasizes disclosure.  Under the first-to-
invent system, a first inventor who fails to fully develop an invention 
might be awarded the patent over a subsequent “independent inventor who 
is prepared to develop, manufacture, and market that item.”116  Under the 
same circumstances, the first-to-file system “would not have the 
undesirable effect of preventing an independent, but second, inventor from 
marketing his or her product in a situation in which the first inventor is not 
yet willing or able to take the first steps toward doing so.”117  The first-to-
file system also offers some protection to an applicant who was 
sufficiently active prior to the application’s filling date, but was not the 
first applicant to file.118  Often referred to as “prior user’s rights,” these 
rights offer later inventors an incentive to continue their innovation, which 
                                                 
112
 Id. at 251-52, 267. 
113
 See, Mossinghoff, supra note 88, at 427-28 (concluding that “there are many good 
reasons why the United States should . . . adopt[] a first-inventor-to-file system.”). 
114
 Id. at 428. 
115
 Id. 
116
 Curesky, supra note 96, at 296. 
117
 Id. 
118
 MOY, supra note 97. 
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incentive is lacking in the “all-or-nothing” approach of the first-to-invent 
system.119 
 
[35]  Lastly, the adoption of the first-to-file system is a prerequisite for 
global harmonization.  In its 21st Century Strategic Plan, the PTO outlined 
its ongoing efforts to “[s]treamline intellectual property systems and 
strengthen intellectual property rights around the world.”120  Specifically, 
                                                 
119
 Under the current first-to-invent system, the prior use of an invention may invalidate 
a subsequent patent.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (b).  Upon invalidation of the patent, 
the subject matter reverts to the public domain.  Also, under the current first-to-file 
system, an inventor who does not secure patent protection for his invention may later be 
prohibited from practicing or using his invention by the likelihood of infringing another’s 
patent. Section 273 of the proposed Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, however, 
provided limited but important rights to the prior user of an invention.  Section 273 reads:  
A person shall not be liable as an infringer under a 
patent granted to another with respect to any subject 
matter claimed in the patent that such person has, 
acting in good faith, commercially used or 
commercially sold in the United States, or has made 
effective and serious preparation therefore [sic] in the 
United States, before the filling date or priority date 
of the application for patent. . . . [r]ights based on 
prior use under this section are personal and shall not 
be subject to assignment or transfer to any other 
person or persons except in connection with the 
assignment or transfer of the entire business or 
enterprise to which the rights relate. [Derivation] A 
person shall be deemed to have acted in good faith in 
establishing rights under this section if the subject 
matter has not been derived from the inventor. 
See Patent System Harmonization Act, S. 2605, 102d Cong. (1992), available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:s.02605:; see also H.R. 4978, 102d 
Cong. (1992), available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HR04978:.  
Under § 273, a prior user would receive the personal right to continue his practice of the 
invention without liability as an infringer under a subsequently granted patent.  This 
exemption requires a user to demonstrate his own commercial use or preparation of the 
invention in the United States prior to the filing date of the patent. Furthermore, § 273 
prohibits the transfer or sale of these rights.  See, e.g., Griswold & Ubel, supra note 7, at 
571.  
120
 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 7 
(2003), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf [hereinafter PTO 
Strategic Plan]. 
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the PTO listed the first objective of “Global Development” as “resolv[ing] 
major issues in a broader context and pursu[ing] substantive 
harmonization goals that will strengthen the rights of American 
intellectual property holders by making it easier to obtain international 
protection for their inventions and creations.”121  Because the United 
States is the only nation using the first-to-invent system, its adherence to 
this system prevents its participation in those harmonization treaties 
designed to facilitate global intellectual property protection. 
 
PART V. THE CALL FOR PATENT REFORM 
 
[36]  Despite its proven success, the American patent system has been at 
the center of the reform debate for decades.122  Among the several areas of 
patent practice targeted for reform are post-grant opposition, continuation 
applications, re-definition of prior art, the best mode requirement, and the 
adoption of the first-to-file system.  Proponents of reform aim to improve 
patent quality, streamline administrative procedures at the PTO, and 
provide a better system for rewarding innovation.123 
 
[37]  The United States International Trade Commission, a government 
agency authorized to investigate unfair import practices, estimates that the 
United States loses approximately 23.8 billion dollars annually due to 
piracy of intellectual property that originated in the United States.124  
Because the United States suffers as a result of this intellectual property 
                                                 
121
 Id. at 7. 
122
 In 1967, the President’s Commission on the Patent System identified six areas for 
patent reform: 1) raise the quality and the reliability of the United States patent; 2) 
shorten the total pendency of an application; 3) accelerate the public disclosure of 
technological advances; 4) reduce the expenses of litigation; 5) make United States’ 
patent practice more compatible with that of other major countries and more consistent 
with the objectives of the United States’ patent system; and 6) prepare our patent system 
to handle the technology explosion of the near future.  S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 11-12 (1967).  
123
 Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the 
United States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to 
Patent Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 759 
(2006). 
124
 Jeffrey K. Sheldon & Danton K. Mak, First-to-File v. First-to-Invent: A Bone of 
Contention in the International Harmonization of U.S. Patent Law, 
http://www.usip.com/articles/1st2fil.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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theft, both domestic and foreign pressure to reform the American patent 
system by harmonizing with other nations across the globe has been 
mounting.  
 
A. Foreign Pressure 
 
[38]  As the only country operating under a first-to-invent system, the 
United States is at the center of the patent harmonization debate.  As 
scholar Edward Lee has argued, there is an increased incentive for entities 
to seek intellectual property protection both domestically and abroad in 
today’s global market.125  “Something considered a valuable commodity in 
one place . . . is likely to be a valuable commodity in other places around 
the world, but entities do not have the luxury of obtaining a single grant of 
IP protection that applies universally.”126  The lack of uniformity amongst 
the various patent-granting countries complicates an applicant’s attempts 
to secure widespread protection for his invention.  The World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) hopes to alleviate this complication.  
 
[39]  In 1984, WIPO convened a committee of experts to draft a treaty for 
the international harmonization of patent law.127  By 1991, the Draft 
Treaty was ready for review128 and a convention of international delegates 
assembled to discuss it.129  The treaty contained provisions that would 
have required the United States to make serious modifications to its patent 
                                                 
125
 Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic 
Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 9 (2005). 
126
 Id. 
127
 Edward G. Fiorito, The “Basic Proposal” for Harmonization of U.S. and Worldwide 
Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 84 (1991).  
See also Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property as far as Patents are Concerned, U.N. W.I.P.O., U.N. Doc. PLT/DC/3 (1990). 
128
 Fiorito, supra note 127, at 88.  On December 21, 1990, WIPO published a basic 
proposal draft treaty.  Article 9, § 2 was entitled “Two or More Inventors Claim the Same 
Invention” and read, “The invention shall belong to the applicant with the earliest priority 
date.”  
129
 See Memorandum prepared by the Chairman of the Committees of Experts, WIPO 
CRNR/DC/6 (August 30, 1996), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ 
olia/diplconf/6dc_mem.htm (providing a summary of the activities of WIPO as it pertains 
to the Draft Treaty and patent harmonization). 
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practice.130  The treaty discussions were progressing satisfactorily and the 
final session was scheduled for July 1993, but the United States 
indefinitely delayed the final session131 and then later failed to return to 
the negotiations.132  On January 24, 1994, Commerce Secretary Ronald H. 
Brown officially announced that the United States would not sign the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty, but rather, it would “maintain [its] first-to-
invent system, while keeping open the option of full patent harmonization 
in the future.”133 
 
[40]  Despite the convention’s failure to ratify the Draft Treaty, some 
progress toward harmonization has been made.  Subsequently, on 
December 8, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, which became effective on January 
1, 1994.134  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
contained several provisions relating to intellectual property law.135 
According to the agreement, Canada, Mexico, and the United States must 
“accord nationals of the other parties [sic] treatment no less favorable than 
                                                 
130
 The treaty mandated the adoption of the first-to-file system and created an 
accompanying prior use defense. The treaty also required publication of patent 
applications and a determination of the patent term based on the filing date rather than the 
issuance date.  In exchange for these concessions, the United States asked for 1) a grace 
period for disclosures, 2) the removal of the absolute novelty provision, 3) the removal of 
the pre-grant opposition proceeding, 4) the ability to file applications in English, with the 
English copy to serve as the official copy in cases of translation errors, and 5) an 
international doctrine of equivalents.  Anneliese M. Seifert, Will the United States Take 
the Plunge Into Global Patent Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States’ 
Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV 173, 
184 (2002). 
131
 Pritchard, supra note 99, at 301-02.  
132
 The United States initially justified the delay by stating that it needed time to select a 
new commissioner of PTO and formulate a clear position on patent harmonization.  Id.  
133
 See U.S. Says “Not Now” on First-to-File and Agrees with Japan on Patent Term, 47 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1164, at 285 (Jan. 27, 1994).  See also The 
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of Commerce 
45 (1992) (stating that the United States is reluctant to switch unless it can “obtain[] a 
favorable harmonization ‘package’ which, on the whole, provides a net positive benefit to 
U.S. inventors around the world.”). 
134
 Bill to Implement NAFTA Signed with Provisions that Affect IP Law, 47 Pat. & 
Trademark Copyright J. (BNA) 139 (1993) [hereinafter Bill to Implement]. 
135
 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2002). 
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that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”136  To comply with this 
provision, the United States amended section 104 of the Patent Act to read 
“an applicant for a patent, or a patentee, may not establish a date of 
invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with 
respect thereto, in a foreign country other than a NAFTA country . . . .”137  
This amendment placed inventors in these foreign countries on equal 
footing with American inventors.  Following this amendment, inventive 
acts occurring in Canada or Mexico were acceptable forms of evidence 
during a priority dispute.138  
 
[41]  The negotiations for a second major treaty, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), ended on December 15, 1993.139  The 
GATT negotiations produced the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement.140  Hailed by participants as one of 
the most significant sections of the pact,141 the TRIPs Agreement 
obligated over 140 countries belonging to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to provide minimum standards of protection for intellectual 
property rights.142  However, for those issues not governed by a 
predetermined minimum standard, the TRIPs Agreement allows its 
signatories to employ their own, and sometimes widely varying, 
                                                 
136
 Bill to Implement, supra note 134, at 139. 
137
 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (2002). Prior to NAFTA, 35 U.S.C. § 104 restricted evidence 
of inventive acts to events occurring in the United States. NAFTA expanded that 
geographic limitation to include inventive acts occurring in Canada and Mexico.  See 
NAFTA § 4(A)-(B). 
138
 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3).  In short, American inventors must now compete against large 
companies with disposable resources from two additional countries in interference 
proceedings.  Hence, the statutory advantage that once favored the small and less solvent 
inventor over foreign corporations in Canada and Mexico has disappeared. 
139
 Uruguay Round of GATT Talks are Concluded With IP Provisions, 47 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 170, 170 (Dec. 23, 1993). 
140
 Id. 
141
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M 81, 95 (1994) [hereinafter The TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
142
 The TRIPs Agreement, however, did not synchronize intellectual property laws, but 
rather, provided a baseline from which its various signatories can deviate.  See generally 
id.  
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approaches. Furthermore, Article 27 requires all parties to the TRIPs 
Agreement to make patents available “without discrimination as to the 
place of invention.”143  Once again, the United States amended section 104 
of the Patent Act.  The new version of section 104 allows an inventor to 
establish a date of invention with evidence of conception, diligence, and 
reduction to practice in any WTO member nation.144 
 
B. Domestic Pressure 
 
[42]  In 1965, the United States Presidential Committee on the Patent 
System exhaustively examined the American patent system.145  The 
committee made thirty-five specific recommendations for significant 
changes to patent practice,146 including the adoption of the first-to-file 
patent system.  At that time, widespread opposition from several industry 
and legal associations prompted Congress to reject the adoption of the 
first-to-file system.147  
                                                 
143
 The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141, at 93-94. 
144
 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1).   
145
 Recognizing that the “general character of [the] patent system ha[d] undergone no 
substantial change since 1836,” President Lyndon B. Johnson established The President’s 
Commission on the Patent System.  The President charged the Commission with:  
1) ascertaining the degree to which our patent system currently serves 
our national needs and international goals, (2) identifying any aspects 
of the system which may need change, (3) devising possible 
improvements in the system, and (4) recommending any legislation 
deemed essential to strengthen the United States patent system. In 
carrying out its evaluation, and in achieving these objectives, the 
Commission shall make an independent study of the existing patent 
system of the United States including its relationship to international 
and foreign patent systems, inventive activity and the administration of 
the system. 
Exec. Order No. 11215, 30 Fed. Reg. at 4661 (Apr. 8, 1965). 
146
 To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, Report of the President’s Comm’n on the 
Patent System, S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 3-4 (1967).  Among the recommendations of the 
President’s Commission were 1) to raise the quality and the reliability of the United 
States patent, 2) to shorten the total pendency of a patent application, 3) to accelerate the 
public disclosure of technological advances, 4) to reduce the expenses of litigation, 5) to 
make the American patent process more compatible with that of other major countries, 
and 6) to prepare the patent system to handle the imminent technology explosion.  Id. 
147
 Conley, supra note 11, at 781. 
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[43]  However, when the PTO declared in its 21st Century Strategic Plan 
that “the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) [was] under 
siege,”148 Congress responded by proffering a number of proposals for 
patent reform.  For example, on October 8, 2004, Representative Howard 
Berman (D-CA) introduced House Report 5299 entitled the “Patent 
Quality Assistance Act of 2004.”149  Beginning on April 20, 2005, the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property 
conducted hearings on its Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality 
Improvement.150 Several prominent organizations testified at the hearings 
including the Patent and Trademark Office, the American Bar Association, 
the Intellectual Property Owners Association, and the Business Software 
Alliance.151  Following the hearings, Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX), 
the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property, revised the Committee Print and introduced House 
Report 2795 entitled the “Patent Reform Act of 2005.”152  On July 26, 
2005, he subsequently entered an amendment in the form of a substitution 
to House Report 2795..153  In early April 2006, Representatives Berman 
(CA-28) and Rick Boucher (D-VA) introduced into the House of 
Representatives the “Patents Depend on Quality Act” or House Report 
5096.154  Interestingly, the Patents Depend on Quality Act omitted several 
key provisions previously introduced by House Report 2795, including the 
statutory adoption of the first-to-file system.155 
 
[44]  Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) offered one 
of the most recent of these congressional patent reform proposals. On 
                                                 
148
 PTO Strategic Plan, supra note 120, at 1.  
149
 Patent Quality Assistance Act of 2004, H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.05299:. 
150
 See generally Patent Quality Improvement Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/20709.pdf. 
151
 Id. at III.   
152
 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.2795:.  
153
 Id.  
154
 Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-5096. 
155
 Id. 
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August 3, 2006, the senators introduced Senate Bill 3108 entitled the 
“Patent Reform Act of 2006.”156  Senate Bill 3108 required a statutory 
adoption of the first-to-file patent system for awarding priority in a patent 
dispute.157  As Senator Leahy explained, “if the United States is to 
preserve its position at the forefront of innovation, as the global leader in 
intellectual property and technology, then we need to move forward . . . 
[t]his legislation is not an option, but a necessity.”158  The bill was referred 
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.159 
 
[45]  On April 17, 2007, both Representative Berman and Senator Leahy 
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 2007.160  Both bills discard the 
current first-to-invent system for awarding priority and, instead, provide 
rights to the first-inventor-to-file. Consequently, both bills also eliminate 
interference proceedings.161  Furthermore, both bills require the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office to provide various 
Congressional committees with a report detailing “the operation of prior 
user rights in selected countries in the industrialized world.”162  On 
September 7, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House Report 
                                                 
156
 Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.03818:. 
157
 Id.  
158
 Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch Introduce Sweeping Patent 
Reform Bill (Aug. 4, 2006), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200608/080406.html. 
159
 All pertinent Congressional actions regarding S. 3818 are available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.03818:. 
160
 Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visted Oct. 8, 2007); 
Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Congress (2007), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
161
 Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007) § 3 Right 
of the First Inventor to File, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-
1908 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007); Govtracks.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th 
Congress (2007), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2007).  
162
 Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007) § 5 Right 
of the Inventor to Obtain Damages, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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1908 by a vote of 220 Ayes to 175 Nays.163  On Sep 11, 2007, the Senate 
placed House Report 1908 on the Senate Legislative Calendar under 
General Orders, Calendar No. 348.164  
 
[46]  The private sector also became very active in the patent reform 
debate.  Following the Oversight Hearings and the introduction of H.R. 
2795, the American Intellectual Property Law Association drafted a 
proposal for patent reform entitled “Balanced and Achievable Patent Law 
Reform, Now.”165  The proposal, a redline mark-up version of H.R. 2795, 
advocated the elimination of the best mode requirement, codification of 
the duty of candor, and the adoption of the first-to-file patent system.166  
Likewise, on September 1, 2005,  the Coalition for 21st Century Patent 
Law Reform provided a redline mark-up version of H.R. 2795.167  
Comprised of companies such as Cargill, Pfizer, 3M Company, General 
Electric, Merck, Monsanto, and Johnson & Johnson,168 the Coalition 
“advocat[es] for patent reforms that will continue to foster innovation and 
enhance American competitiveness.”169  
 
[47]  However, each of these congressional attempts to introduce patent 
reform has failed due to the termination of the legislative session. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
163
 Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908#votes (last visited Oct. 8, 
2007). 
164
 Id. 
165
 American Intellectual Property Law Association, Balanced and Achievable Patent 
Law Reform, Now, 2005, http://www.fr.com/news/AchievablePatentReform.pdf. 
166
 Id.  
167
 American Intellectual Property Law Association, A Coalition for 21st Century Patent 
Law Reform: Balanced Initiatives to Advance Quality and Provide Litigation Reforms, 
Sept. 1 2005, http://www.fr.com/news/2005-09-14_Coalition_Draft.pdf. 
168
 For more information on the Coalition, please see its website, available at 
http://www.patentsmatter.com/index.php.  A list of Coalition members is available at 
http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/coalition.php. 
169
 The Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, Patents Matter, 
http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/who_we_are.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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PART VI. WHY FIRST-TO-FILE IS NOT THE ANSWER 
 
[48]  The primary motivation behind global patent harmonization is the 
consistency and uniformity of intellectual property laws and protection.  
Aligning the American system with those of the European Union and 
Japan would allow for mutual reciprocity between these three patent 
systems,170 particularly as it relates to acknowledging and enforcing those 
patents granted by any one of these patent giants.171  Authors Dana 
Rohrabacher and Paul Crilly caution, however, against harmonizing the 
patent system for reciprocity purposes. These authors liken patent 
harmonization to Ulysses’ Trojan horse.172  In short, this seemingly 
innocuous action will whittle down America’s strong patent system.  The 
authors wrote: 
Yes, uniformity of law throughout the world has a ring to 
it.  However, harmonization is being paid for by decreasing 
our guaranteed patent term.  Uniformity merely for its own 
sake and without any quantitative benefit to Americans 
does not make any sense.  If the objective is to have a 
uniform worldwide patent system, other nations should 
adopt the stronger United States model.173 
 
Even now, the United States is tempted by the lure of patent 
harmonization and reciprocity.  Congress has already amended the Patent 
                                                 
170
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 765. 
171
 Id. at 766.  See Michael D. Kaminski, Patent Harmonization: International Efforts 
Are Gradually Unifying the World's Patent Laws, 4 MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, JAN. 
2001, at 36-37, available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i01/html/patents.html; see also United 
States Patent & Trademark Office, Pursuit of Substantive Patent Law Harmonization, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/gd1i01.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 
2007) (stating the goal of promoting harmonization and making it easier for American 
intellectual property holders to obtain international protection); United States Patent & 
Trademark Office, Statement of Intent, 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak08feb2005.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) 
(stating desire “to consider: (i) substantive patent law harmonization issues, notably the 
Trilateral ‘first package,’ as developed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office[.]”). 
172
 Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 263, 272 (1995). 
173
 Id. 
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Act on several occasions to synchronize its laws with foreign countries, 
which in the case of §104, has been detrimental to the American 
inventor.174 
 
[49]  Is abandonment of the American first-to-invent system truly that 
desirable? How will the first-to-file system benefit the American patent 
machine?  As one commentator urged, “[a] first-to-file statute that would 
give patent rights to the more astute filer rather than the more astute 
inventor is . . . impermissible.”175  After all, reward for innovation is the 
hallmark of the American patent system. In fact, many believe that this is 
the key factor behind this system’s success.176  The first-to-file system is 
not the panacea it pretends to be, and therefore, “[i]t should be of no 
concern to us that the majority of countries have a first-to-file system.  A 
system that is inferior doesn’t become less so because it has many more 
adherents.”177 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
174
 See id.  The United States has twice amended 35 U.S.C. § 104, and now allows 
applicants to present evidence of inventive acts in any WTO nation.  35 U.S.C. § 104 
(2000).  Furthermore, the term of patent protection was altered to conform to the 
international standard set forth in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.  35 
U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311-18 (2000).  The United States amended § 122(b) in 2000 to 
require the publication of a patent application after eighteen months; § 271(a) in 2003 to 
designate “offers to sell” and “importation” as forms of patent infringement, and; § 
154(a)(2) in 2002 to change the patent term from seventeen years after issuance, to 
twenty years after filing.  35 U.S.C. §§ 122(b), 271(a), 154(a)(2). 
175
 David L. Simon, The First-to-File Provisions of the Patent Reform Act of 2005 
Violate the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause (2005), 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/First-to-file_unconstitutional.pdf. 
176
 See Conley, supra note 11, at 782 (“There can be little doubt that the United States' 
patent system . . . has been the most successful in the world.  The technological lead . . . 
cannot be explained by our having smarter people, or more daring people, or better 
educated people, or more government support for technological development.”). 
177
 Gabriel Katona, First-to-File – Not in the United States, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC'Y 399, 399-400 (1991).  Furthermore, it is shortsighted to believe that the first-
to-file system will rectify American patent woes.  “The situation in this country cannot be 
compared to that in other countries which have lived for a long time under a first-to-file 
system.”  Id. at 400.   
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A. The First-to-File System Stifles Innovation 
 
[50]  The current American patent system is unique because it stimulates 
extraordinary progress.  “Under the first-to-invent system, the main 
incentive to innovate is the hope of profit.  Accordingly, a system that 
gives the exclusive right to this profit without diverting any portion of it to 
other inventors optimizes this motivation.”178  For instance, Professor 
Conley concluded “the United States’ patent system has been one of the 
major differences between the environments in which inventors work.  
That system is and has been unique among the democratic, capitalistic, 
developed nations which have political and economic systems conducive 
to success in technological development.”179  Even advocates of the first-
to-file patent system acknowledge that the American system has been 
extremely successful.  During its congressional testimony, the American 
Bar Association stated, “[i]t seems quite likely that features that 
distinguish our patent system from those countries which have not 
experienced our remarkable rate of growth, are . . . responsible for that 
rate of growth. Surely the most significant of those features is our system 
rewarding the first to invent . . . .”180 
 
[51]  The American patent system provides more incentive to innovate 
than the first-to-file system.181  In those countries using a first-to-file 
system, there is a relative decrease in the number of inventions.182  This 
                                                 
178
 Stephanie Gore, ‘Eureka! But I Filed Too Late . . .’: The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of 
a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293, 311 (1993).  The 
success of the American patent system over the past 200 years stems from the 
conveyance of exclusive monopolistic rights to the first inventor, which provides 
tremendous financial incentive to an innovator.  Id.  When compared with the United 
States’ first-to-invent patent system, the first-to-file system does provide a sufficient 
incentive because the patent is awarded to the inventor who files first and prior users’ 
rights break up any monopoly.  Id.  See also Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The 
Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United States: Is a Globally Standardized 
Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and Administrative 
Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 759, 765 (2006). 
179
 Conley, supra note 11, at 782. 
180
 Christian J. Garascia, Evidence of Conception in U.S. Patent Interference Practice: 
Proving Who Is the First and True Inventor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 717, 723 n.49 
(1996). 
181
 Conley, supra note 11, at 782.  
182
 Gore, supra note 178, at 311.  See also id. at 787. 
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trend is likely linked to the fact that in the United States, “the focus of the 
patent system is to protect the individual patentees and provide them with 
exclusive rights to their inventions.”183  This concept resonates with all 
parties who aim to protect their intellectual property because the reward 
for hard work and ingenuity is inextricably linked to the American dream.   
 
[52]  The first-to-file system is not based on conception.  Rather, this 
system recognizes ownership rights only in technology that finds its way 
into the disclosure of a patent application.184  Therefore, the adoption of 
the first-to-file system would reduce the incentive for small entities and 
individual inventors to innovate and subsequently file patent applications.  
Consequently, “fewer patents would issue to entrepreneurs and the United 
States would lose a major factor affecting its lead in technological 
development.”185 
 
B. Patent Quality Will Suffer Under the First-to-File System 
 
[53]  Patent quality has been defined as “a broad, multi-faceted concept 
most often discussed in the abstract without any specific context that 
would permit quantifiable measurement.”186  Different aspects of patent 
quality include validity, notice, teaching, and value.187  The first-to-file 
system poses a threat to each one of these indicators.188  
                                                 
183
 Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. Companies’ Comparative Patent Experiences in 
Japan, Europe, and the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of 
the S. Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 71 (1994) (statement of Alan I. Mendelowitz, 
Director of International Trade, Finance, and Competitiveness Issues, General 
Government Division, United States General Accounting Office). 
184
 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S. 
COMPANIES’ PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 1 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
185
 Conley, supra note 11, at 787.  “The National Patent Council told the Congressional 
Committee considering first-to-file in the 1960s that such a change in the U.S. patent 
laws ‘would load the dice against one of the most potent innovating forces in our 
economy: the initiative and drive of the independent inventor and small businessman.’”  
Id.  
186
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 768. 
187
 Id. at 768-69.  The authors describe patent quality as follows: “(1) the validity of the 
issued claims (the ‘validity facet’), (2) the extent of the claim scope (the ‘notice facet’), 
(3) the effectiveness of the patent at teaching the invention to society (the ‘teaching 
facet’), and (4) the value, or usefulness, of the patented invention itself (the ‘value facet’).  
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[54]  Because “the objective of a first-to-file patent system is, in effect, to 
reward early filing and punish late filing,”189 many believe the first-to-file 
system endorses a “race to the patent office.”190  This race to the PTO 
causes several problems.  First, the first-to-file system does not afford an 
inventor a choice.191  The inventor no longer has the opportunity to 
develop the invention through its entirety, knowing that the invention is 
protected under a priority system that awards conception and diligence 
rather than the ministerial act of filing a patent application.  Such a process 
of awarding priority of inventorship will precipitate “hasty application 
drafting with limited experimental exemplification or support.”192  In 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 768.  See also R. Polk Wagner, The Patent Quality Index (2006), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/pqi/documents/2006_1_presentation.pdf. 
188
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 769.  See also American Innovation at 
Risk: The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of Suzanne Michel, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel & Deputy Assistant 
Director of Public Coordination, FTC). Michel remarked that patents of questionable 
quality can “distort competition, innovation, and the marketplace . . . .”  Id.  Michel listed 
four ways by which this can occur.  First, questionable patents “slow follow-on 
innovation by discouraging firms from conducting research and development in areas that 
the patent improperly covers . . . [s]econd, patents that should not have been granted raise 
costs when they are challenged in litigation . . . [t]hird, questionable patents may raise 
costs by inducing unnecessary licensing . . . [f]ourth, firms facing patent thickets may 
spend resources obtaining ‘defensive patents,’ not to protect their own innovation from 
use by others, but to have ‘bargaining chips’ to obtain access to others’ patents through a 
cross-license, or to counter allegations of infringement.”  Id.  
189
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767. 
190
 A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, 1987 COMMITTEE 
REPORTS 62 (Mark T. Banner ed., 1987).  See also MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, PATENT 
INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1984).  
191
 See Conley, supra note 11, at 786.  Conley writes: 
Often the decision would be forced on the inventor. If funds are 
limited, he may not be able to afford to file two or more applications, 
he may not be able to pay for a prior art search to help him decide 
whether patent protection is likely, he many be able to pay for even the 
first, limited disclosure application. He might, out of necessity, have to 
wait until the invention is further developed to attract financing from 
others.   
Id.  
192
 A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 190, at 62.  
See also MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, supra note 190; Banner & McDonnell, supra note 93, 
at 610. 
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short, the first-to-file system “encourage[s] speculative filing of 
applications on unproven inventions by ‘idea men’ rather than actual 
development of useful commercial inventions, and would retard rather 
than promote progress.”193 
 
[55]  Second, the first-to-file system lacks the inherent deterrents of the 
first-to-invent system.194  For example, those applicants who later discover 
that patent protection is not worth pursuing will have already incurred 
substantial costs.195  An applicant in this situation often “proceed[s] with 
the patent application, even at the sacrifice of funds needed to develop the 
invention, and even though [its] concept is so sketchy that providing a 
detailed description of the invention is impossible.”196 
 
[56]  Third, the first-to-file system dilutes the quality of patents.  
“[A]doption of the first-to-file would change the mentality of many patent 
practitioners and applicants.”197  There will be an “inherent disincentive to 
prepare a careful and thoughtful patent application in which the prior art is 
well-searched and the claims of the invention are initially drafted to 
overcome the prior art.”198  Rather, the first-to-file system rewards “quick 
and short filings that disclose . . . the details of one aspect of an invention, 
but undertake no evaluation of which features or benefits of the invention 
distinguish it over the prior art.”199  Consequently, attorneys are more 
likely to draft overly broad disclosures, exhibiting less quality in terms of 
the teaching and providing adequate notice to the public regarding the 
scope of the claimed material.200  In the words of one practitioner, the 
“first-to-file” system will generate “sketchy disclosures.”201 
                                                 
193
 Conley, supra note 11, at 789.  See also Kim Taylor, Note, Patent Harmonization 
Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First-to-File” Debate Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 
521, 535 (1994).   
194
 Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International 
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 217-18 (1990). 
195
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767. 
196
 Conley, supra note 11, at 786.  See also id. at 766-67. 
197
 Macedo, supra note 194, at 217. 
198
 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767. 
199
 Id. 
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 Id.  See also Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 
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C. The First-to-File System is Unfair to Small Businesses and Independent 
Inventors 
 
[57]  Most patents are issued to small companies and individual 
inventors.202  Because the first-to-file system rewards “the winner . . . to 
the Patent Office, and elevates paperwork over true invention,”203 the 
adoption of this system by the United States “would load the dice against 
one of the most potent innovating forces in [its] economy: the initiative 
and drive of the independent inventor and small businessman . . . .”204  The 
first-to-file system “favor[s] corporate inventors and multinationals at the 
expense of independent inventors and small businesses.”205  Under the 
first-to-file system, the first early filing would secure priority, and as the 
development of the invention continued, subsequent filings would provide 
full protection.206  
 
[58]  The repetitious nature of this sort of filing troubles small entities for 
two primary reasons.  First, large and multinational “organizations have 
the requisite monetary, legal, and technical resources to consistently file 
first . . . .”207  Independent inventors and small businesses do not.  
Therefore, the first-to-file system endangers their economic prosperity 
because they simply cannot afford to automatically file applications on 
every invention nor can they maintain the practice of filing early and filing 
often.208  Second, this type of continuous filing jeopardizes efforts to 
                                                                                                                         
Circuit of Appeals adhere to the fundamental principle that claims define the scope of 
patent protection). 
201
 Conley, supra note 11, at 788.  See also Donald S. Chisum, The Harmonization of 
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 448 (1993); Taylor, supra note 
96, at 535. 
202
 Robert X. Cringely, Patently Absurd: Patent Reform Legislation in Congress 
Amounts to Little More Than a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for Microsoft, PBS.COM, 
Aug. 18, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2005/pulpit_20050818_000863.html. 
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 Taylor, supra note 96, at 536 (citing to Patent Harmonization Proposal Stirs Lively 
Debate at PTO Hearing, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 508, 510-11 
(1993)). 
204
 Conley, supra note 11, at 787. 
205
 Taylor, supra note 96, at 536. 
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 Id. at 535.  See also Conley, supra note 11, at 787. 
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 Gore, supra note 178, at 294. 
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attract new sponsors and researchers.209  The first-to-file system is “likely 
to drive up the costs of early-stage technology development by forcing 
more money and resources to be expended earlier in the development 
process to prepare and file patent applications before actually reducing the 
inventions to practice and determining their usefulness or commercial 
viability.”210 Hence, the first-to-file system will “pretty much be the death 
knell of independent inventors.”211 
 
[59]  Small entities cannot survive in such a hostile environment.  Under 
the first-to-file system, they are at risk of having a “big corporation with 
big money highjack[] their ideas and obtain[] an exclusive patent merely 
because it filed the patent first.”212 Creativity will suffer as inventors are 
discouraged by having to conform to a system that does not reward 
innovation, but rather, rewards business acumen and the drive to capitalize 
on the ingenuity of others.  Conversely, the first-to-invent system levels 
the playing field, providing both small and large entities with the same 
advantages and disadvantages.  For example, in his study, Mossinghoff 
determined that “a small entity was advantaged by the first-to-invent 
system if the small entity was the junior party in the interference . . . .”213  
By awarding the patent on the basis of inventorship rather than on the act 
of filing, the first-to-invent system neutralizes the deep pockets of large, 
powerful, and extremely solvent companies. 
 
D. The First-to-File System Will Increase Litigation 
 
[60]  Advocates of the first-to-file system argue that this system will 
provide a certainty of knowledge that cannot be conveyed under the 
                                                                                                                         
(suggesting that the first-to-file system “means increased costs to the user, because the 
cost of increased filing necessitated by a first-to-file system will undoubtedly exceed the 
cost of litigating a rare, very occasional interference under the present system.”).  
209
 Steven Ludwig, U.S. Patent Reform and the Future of Nanotechnology, 20 LEGAL 
BACKGROUNDER, at *3 (2005). 
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 Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767-68 n.41. 
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 John R. Emshwiller, Patent-Law Proposals Irk Small Inventors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 
1992, at B1.  
212
 Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent 
Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH. 
L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2006). 
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current first-to-invent system.  Such certainty is elusive.  The attempts to 
put the essence of an invention into words and to explain how the 
invention is patentably novel and nonobvious over all others are 
formidable tasks.  Even after careful hours of drafting, claims will always 
be subject to various interpretations.  As one court explained, “[a] verbal 
portrayal [of an invention] is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the 
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows 
for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled . . . [t]hings 
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.”214 
 
[61]  As literary descriptions, patent applications are tenuous at best.  Any 
attempt to indicate otherwise is misleading.  Regardless of the type of 
patent system, inventors, practitioners, the PTO, and the judiciary will 
always operate within a framework of words that naturally create 
uncertainty.  Therefore, while the system of awarding priority may 
influence the nature of the dispute, litigation will never be removed 
entirely from the patent equation. 
 
[62]  During congressional hearings on patent reform, the Manufacturing 
Chemists Association, Inc. stated: 
 
The granting of the patent to the first to file will necessitate the 
filing of applications of narrow scope prematurely and encourage 
the filing of prophetic, scientifically unsound disclosures by less 
meticulous inventors to the detriment of the careful scientist.  This 
result has long been observed in Europe which has a “first to file” 
system.  The incomplete disclosures of many European patents 
issued in the chemical field are viewed as insufficiently 
informative by American Scientists and engineers.  In our opinion, 
therefore, the adoption of this provision will result in the filing of 
many “half-baked” patent applications.215 
 
Under the pressure to file first in the first-to-file system, mistakes will 
happen.  “A patent application is not like filling in blanks on a form.  It 
takes time and thought to move from a decent first draft, to a really fine, 
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finished product.  So first-to-file will certainly yield some degradation in 
the quality of the applications as filed.”216 
 
[63]  The first-to-file system will foster poor patent quality, which will 
result in an increase in patent litigation.  New procedural changes will spur 
the filing of suits as the patent bar struggles to make the transition from 
the first-to-invent to the first-to-file system.  Disappointed, disgruntled, 
and confused applicants who were not the first applicants to file will vent 
their frustration towards the patent bar.  “[T]he litigious nature of 
Americans lends the bar’s fears some credibility . . . . Without the 
safeguard of swearing back with an affidavit to the invention date, 
attorneys will be exposed to liability whenever they fail to file within a 
very short time period.”217  The pressure to be the first applicant to file 
will lead to a “flood of malpractice suits.”218  
 
E. The First-to-File System Represents a Challenge to the Constitution 
 
[64]  Unlike the English Statute of Monopolies, the Intellectual Property 
Clause does not include language that explicitly restricts the grant of a 
patent to the first and true inventor.219  Many believe that the omission of 
the phrase “first and true inventor” permits a patent to be awarded to 
someone other than the first inventor and emphasize that Congress failed 
to provide a resolution for interfering patents in the Patent Act of 1790.220  
However, an analysis of the framers’ intent as well as statutory language 
of the early patent acts demonstrate that the Constitution authorizes the 
patent to be awarded only to the “first and true inventor.”  To hold 
otherwise poses a direct challenge to the Constitution. 
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 Jack Zemlicka, Patent Changes Pending, WIS. L. J., Oct. 4, 2006, 
http:/www.wislawjournal.com/archive/2006/1004/patent.html (quoting remarks of 
attorney Joseph T. Leone). 
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 Macedo, supra note 194, at 223.  Macedo acknowledges that, “the possibility of 
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 Id. at 222. 
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i. The Constitutional and Statutory Language 
 
[65]  Constitutional and statutory language makes it clear that the “first 
inventor” deserved the patent.  The terms “first and true inventor” and 
“original inventor” were codified in the nation’s first two patent acts.221  
As the nation’s first patent act, the Patent Act of 1790 bestowed the 
monopolistic patent right to “the first and true inventor or discoverer.”222  
The act utilized the same language as its English predecessor, the Statute 
of Monopolies. According to The Patent Act of 1790, a patent was “prima 
facie evidence” that the patentee was the “first and true inventor . . . .”223  
The Patent Act of 1790 further provided a process by which a patent could 
be repealed if the “patentee was not the first and true inventor or 
discoverer.”224  The Patent Act of 1793 reiterated the rules set forth three 
years earlier. The Patent Act of 1793 again emphasized awarding the 
patent to the “true inventor.”225  This act also voided a patent upon a 
showing that “the thing, thus secured by the patent, was not originally 
discovered by the patentee,”226 and provided for the repeal of a patent if 
the “patentee was not the true inventor or discoverer.”227 
 
[66]  Congress’ omission of a provision governing the resolution of 
interfering patents from the Patent Act of 1790 does not support a 
statutory interpretation that would grant a patent to an applicant other than 
the first and true inventor.228  Acting under the original Patent Act of 
                                                 
221
 “One commentator explained, ‘the word [‘inventor’] had been made specific in 
meaning by its constant association with the modifiers ‘true’ and ‘first’ in the Statute of 
Monopolies.’” Macedo, supra note 194, at 213 n.107 (1988) (citing Note, The 
Constitutionality of the First-to-File System, 11 IDEA 241 (1967)).   
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 Act of 1790 § 5. 
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 Id. § 6. 
224
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 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (1846) [hereinafter Act of 1793]. 
226
 Id. § 6. 
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 Id. § 10. 
228
 Congress’s omission of an interference system from the first patent act should not be 
read to weaken the constitutional requirement for such a system.  As Marbury v. Madison 
confirmed, an error of constitutional significance in a statute passed by the first Congress 
(in that instance, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789’s overly broad and thus 
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1790, the patent board addressed one of the most famous priority disputes 
in the nation’s history.229  Four different men applied for a patent, each 
claiming a steamboat and other related inventions.230  The patent board 
held several hearings in April 1791, where the four applicants offered 
numerous suggestions for how to resolve the dispute. One such suggestion 
was to award the patent to the first applicant to file.231 The patent board 
discussed this option and rejected it.232  Upon subsequently reviewing the 
evidence, the patent board awarded at least one patent to each of the four 
applicants.233  As one scholar noted, “[i]t is very unlikely that duplicate 
patents were granted to these four steamboat claimants without deciding 
the question of priority.”234 
                                                                                                                         
Rather, it is the statute that must give way.  When the United States enacted its first 
Patent Act in 1790, Congress debated a special mechanism for resolution of patent 
priority disputes.  See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 5, II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665 (1996) 
(providing an in-depth analysis of the steamboat patent priority dispute and its likely 
effect on the Framers).  Although the provision was omitted from the nation’s very first 
patent act, it was included in the first revision of the patent act enacted three years later, 
the Patent Act of 1793. 
229
 The first patent board included Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State.  Federico 
believed that Jefferson’s experiences, including his personal contact with patents, 
convinced him that an inventor should be rewarded with a limited monopoly.  Pasquale J. 
Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 237, 240-41 
(1936).  “Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention 
for some certain time . . . Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive 
liberal encouragement.”  Id.  (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, 
to Oliver Evans (May 1807), in V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75, at 75-76 
(Washington ed., 1807)). 
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 Id. at 248.  
231
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232
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233
 Id. at 248-49.  On August 26, 1791, the patent board awarded 14 total patents to the 
four applicants.  Id. 
234
 Id. at 249.  “The titles of the patents as subsequently reported do not suggest duplicate 
patents.” Id.  The proceedings were notable for the arguments made by Fitch, who cited 
the Statute of Monopolies to contend that he deserved the patent as the “first and true 
inventor.”  The English understanding of first and true inventor was not discussed, and 
the Pennsylvania legislature applied the language literally to find that Fitch should 
receive the patent.  Rumsey had earlier obtained a patent for a “streamboat” in 
Pennsylvania and Virginia.  Fitch used his Pennsylvania patent to oppose Rumsey 
successfully in Virginia, convincing Virginia that Rumsey’s patent covered a different 
invention, but Rumsey prevailed and received a patent in Maryland.  Fitch also obtained 
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[67]  The precedent established by the English Statute of Monopolies 
undeniably guided the framers.  Remember, the English Statute of 
Monopolies awarded the “first and true inventor” with a patent monopoly 
for those inventions that provided benefit to the public.  Although the 
Intellectual Property Clause does not contain the words “first and true 
inventor,” the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 do.  Over forty years later, the 
Patent Act of 1836 also utilized the phrases “original and true inventor” 
and “original and first inventor.”235  Likewise, the Patent Act of 1952 used 
the term “inventor” and required that the applicant sign an oath averring 
that the applicant is “the original and first inventor.”236 The American 
patent system, as envisioned by the framers and codified by the early 
Congresses, has always awarded the patent to the first and true and 
original inventor.  
 
ii. Judicial Interpretation of the Constitutional and Statutory Language 
 
[68]  Chief Justice John Marshall provided numerous insights into 
constitutional interpretation.  In Marbury v. Madison, the Chief Justice 
noted, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect . . . .”237  He explained: 
 
As men, whose intentions require no concealment, 
generally employ the words which most directly and aptly 
express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened 
patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who 
adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in 
                                                                                                                         
patents in New Jersey, Delaware, and New York.  In Pennsylvania, Rumsey and Fitch 
battled again, but somehow the issue mutated into whether Fitch had a right to “improve” 
Rumsey’s design.  The Pennsylvania legislature left both patents intact. According to 
Walterscheid, these state patent battles offer two lessons.  [First,] the states were 
predisposed to award the patent to the “first inventor[.]”  Second, once a patent was 
issued they were inclined to let it stand, even if it had been issued in error.  Carnathan, 
supra note 71, at 773-74 (recounting the patent priority dispute between Fitch and 
competitor Arthur Donaldson) (alteration in original). 
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their natural sense, and to have intended what they have 
said.238 
 
The Chief Justice believed that when the framers’ language was not 
doubtful, their “plain and obvious intent must prevail.”239  
 
[69]  A century later, in United States v. Meyer, Chief Justice Taft echoed 
Marshall’s sentiments.240  Although the Intellectual Property Clause was 
not at issue, Taft’s message was clear.  The first few federal congresses 
were comprised of “a considerable number of those who had been 
members of the convention that framed the Constitution and presented it 
for ratification.”241  Following the Constitutional Convention, nearly half 
the men who signed the Constitution later served in the First Federal 
Congress.242  This was the Congress that “launched the government.”243  
More importantly, “[i]t was a Congress whose constitutional decisions 
have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest 
weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument.”244  As such, 
the Supreme Court has endorsed the “principle that a contemporaneous 
legislative exposition of the Constitution, when the founders of our 
government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in 
public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction 
to be given its provisions.”245  
 
[70]  Such deference to the actions and legislation of these early 
Congresses prompted author Edwin Suominen to ask, “[c]an there thus be 
any doubt about the ‘construction placed upon the constitution’ by the 
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241
 Id. 
242
 See Historical Documents, 
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‘men who were contemporary with its formation’ in the Patent Acts of 
1790 and 1793?”246 
 
[71]  The Court has often recognized that the Intellectual Property Clause 
limits Congress’s power to modify the patent monopoly.  Congress “may 
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  
Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby . . . This is the standard 
expressed in the constitution and may not be ignored.”247  The adoption of 
the first-to-file system enlarges the patent monopoly because this system is 
inconsistent with the intent of the framers and the early Congresses. 
 
[72]  Chief Justice Marshall believed the Constitution and the statutory 
law gave an exclusive inchoate property right to the inventor “from the 
moment of invention.”248 Furthermore, this right could not be “invaded or 
impaired” by anyone nor used “without the consent of the inventor.”249  
According to Marshall, the legislature knew that these exclusive rights 
“vested in the inventor, from the moment of discovery” and were “only 
perfected by the patent . . . .”250  Marshall continued, “[w]ere it otherwise, 
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 Edwin Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8 – The Formula for First-to-
Invent, 83 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 641, 646 (2001). 
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Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)). 
248
 Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564). 
249
 Id.  Marshall revisited the Intellectual Property Clause in a subsequent decision and 
explained: 
The securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their inventions, was 
deemed of so much importance, as a means of promoting the progress 
of science and the useful arts, that the constitution has expressly 
delegated to Congress the power to secure such rights to them for a 
limited period.  The inventor has, during this period, a property in his 
inventions; a property which is often of very great value, and of which 
the law intended to give him the absolute enjoyment and possession. 
Ex Parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824) (emphasis added). 
250
 Evans, 8 F.Cas at 874.  See also A.F. & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 562 (1977) 
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The Constitution speaks of securing to inventors the exclusive right to 
their discoveries, not that the inventor must apply.  Thus, the 
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the exclusive right in the discovery which the constitution authorizes 
congress to secure to the inventor, and the exclusive right to use it after the 
date of the patent, which the act of congress confers, would not be 
exclusive . . . .”251  The adoption of the first-to-file system ignores these 
teachings and authorizes a practice that has no constitutional, statutory, or 
historical basis. 
 
iii. The Judiciary’s Consideration of Foreign Authorities 
 
[73]  The adoption of the first-to-file system may also contaminate the 
American judiciary by endorsing the use of foreign authority in the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution.  The use of foreign 
authorities in American jurisprudence recently soared to new heights.252  
Writing for the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, Supreme Court Justice 
Kennedy relied on a case from the European Court of Human Rights to 
overrule the Court’s seventeen-year-old decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. 
253
  “To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers 
have been rejected elsewhere.”254  According to the Court, the issue in 
                                                                                                                         
constitutional objective of granting a patent (or a reissue patent) to the 
true inventor . . . .).   
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 Evans, 8 F.Cas at 873. 
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Supreme Court to review the delay of execution.  In his dissent from the denial of 
certiorari, Justice Breyer wrote,  
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execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel . . . this Court has 
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courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own 
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances. 
Id. at 995, 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
253
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).  See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981). 
254
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added) (Kennedy, J.) (noting that the European 
Court of Human Rights had not followed Bowers). 
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Lawrence was one that had been “accepted as an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries.”255  Recognizing a right of privacy for 
adults engaged in homosexual sodomy in the United States, Justice 
Kennedy wrote that “other nations . . . have taken action consistent with 
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate, consensual conduct.”256 
 
[74]  Although the American judiciary’s consideration of foreign 
authorities is not novel, it is highly controversial.  Since much of 
American law has its roots in English practices, the American judiciary 
has historically turned to English jurisprudence for insight.  However, the 
growing reliance on an increasingly diverse body of foreign authorities is 
troublesome.  Justice Scalia, for example, rebuked the majority in his 
Lawrence dissent.  “The Court’s discussion of these foreign views . . . is . . 
. meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . 
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”257  In 
an earlier decision, Justice Scalia argued that the practices of the world 
community were irrelevant.258  “[W]here there is not first a settled 
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however 
enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be 
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”259 
 
[75]  The debate continues outside chambers as well.  Current Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens as well as former Justice O’Connor 
believe that foreign authorities are relevant to constitutional 
                                                 
255
 Id. at 577 (emphasis added). 
256
 Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
257
 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)). 
258
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting), cert. granted.  
In Atkins, the defendant-appellant was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to 
death.  At trial, he was described as “mildly mentally retarded.”  The Virginia Supreme 
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.  Certiorari was granted. In a 6-3 decision, 
the Supreme Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals constituted a 
“cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  Id. 
259
 Id.  Scalia’s scathing rebuke persisted, “[b]ut the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble 
Effort to fabricate national consensus must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a 
footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of 
the so-called world community, and respondents to opinion polls.” Id. at 347. 
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interpretation.260  More important, these justices have incorporated foreign 
authorities into their opinions.261  Conversely, current Justices Scalia and 
Thomas have spoken against such a practice262 consistently rejecting the 
                                                 
260
 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International 
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999) (“Comparative analysis 
emphatically is relevant to . . . interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.”); 
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address 
Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law: The Supreme Court and the New International Law (Apr. 4, 2003) (explaining why 
“foreign experience is often important to our work.”), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html; Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address Before 
the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 348 
(March 15, 2002). In her speech, Justice O’Connor asked, “[w]hy does information about 
international law matter so much?  Why should judges and lawyers . . . care about issues 
of foreign law and international law?  The reason, of course, is globalization.  No 
institution of government can afford now to ignore the rest of the world.”  Id. at 349.  She 
also noted that, “conclusions reached by other countries and by the international 
community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”  Id. at 
350. 
261
 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J.); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J.) (noting 
foreign countries’ disapproval of imposing death penalty on the mentally retarded); 
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“[w]illingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in 
a Nation that from its birth has given a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that 
foreign material “may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 785-87 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
262
 Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address 
Before the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: 
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts 305 (Apr. 2, 2004).  During his speech, 
Justice Scalia spoke mostly against using foreign authorities in constitutional cases, 
except for old English authorities relevant to the Framers’ intent.  He acknowledged, 
however, that foreign authorities might be relevant in statutory cases where the statute 
implements a treaty or otherwise “directly or indirectly refer[s] to foreign law.”  Id. at 
305.  Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas appears to be mostly opposed to foreign law 
sources in constitutional cases, but has used them at least once for comparison.  Compare 
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suggestion that the beliefs and practices of the international community 
should be used to “buttress our commitment to American principles.”263  
Justice Scalia, again dissenting, wrote: 
 
It is of course true that we share a common history with the 
United Kingdom, and that we often consult English sources 
when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text 
written against the backdrop of the 18th-century English 
law and legal thought . . . [But it] is beyond comprehension 
why we should look to find our current standards of 
decency] . . . to a country that has developed, in the 
centuries since the Revolutionary War – and with 
increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent 
submission to the jurisprudence of European courts 
dominated by continental jurists – a legal, political, and 
social culture quite different than our own.264 
 
These opinions demonstrate that the Supreme Court is divided.  Because 
the relevance, importance, and most notably, the appropriateness of using 
foreign authorities to guide American jurisprudence is undecided, the 
Court struggles to find balance in its own jurisprudential applications. 
Intellectual property law is no exception to the judiciary’s internal battle.  
If the first-to-file system is adopted, then American courts will inevitably 
turn to the laws, practices, and preferences of foreign countries in deciding 
patent priority issues. 
 
[76]  In the absence of an overarching analytical framework,265 American 
courts have substantial discretion in choosing when, why, which, where, 
and how foreign authorities are considered in the resolution of domestic 
                                                                                                                         
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “this 
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.”), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) 
(stating the court’s duty is to “decide cases ‘agreeably to the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States.’”), with Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (comparing the voting systems of foreign countries to the United States 
system).  
263
 Roper v. Simmons, 543. U.S. 551, 628 (2005). 
264
 Id. at 626. 
265
 Lee, supra note 125, at 13. 
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intellectual property disputes.266  As the number of multi-national 
intellectual property disputes rises, the likelihood increases that a conflict 
arising under the laws of one country will arise under the laws of other 
countries. 267  The pressure to provide uniformity will intensify.  
 
[77]  The Supreme Court recently demonstrated its tremendous discretion 
in deciding whether to incorporate foreign authorities into its analysis of 
two different intellectual property issues.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court 
reasoned that the European Union’s extension of copyright terms 
supported its own conclusion that the United States’ extension of 
copyright had a justifiable basis – that is, harmonization.268  However, in 
the same term and without discussion, the Court rejected an argument that 
European concepts of moral rights should inform the Court’s 
interpretation of the Lanham Act.269 
 
[78]  These two contemporaneous decisions illustrate that utilizing foreign 
authority to interpret the Constitution and statutory law is unpredictable.  
As American courts are called upon with increasing frequency to 
determine the relevance of foreign law in domestic disputes, the lack of a 
bona fide infrastructure will only muddy the waters.  The courts will have 
to undertake the additional burden and expense270 in assessing how 
individual foreign jurisdictions differ from the United States in terms of 
their respective systems of law, governance, culture, politics, and 
economic standing.271  Without a structured framework guiding such an 
analysis, the American judiciary will likely cite foreign authority when it 
supports a favored conclusion and ignore it when it does not.272 
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 Id. 
267
 Id. at 11. 
268
 Id. at 13 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003)). 
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 Id. at 13 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003)). 
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 Id. at 25. 
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 Id. at 5. 
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 See generally Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: 
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 69 (2004) (reviewing the 
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding the use of foreign authorities in settling 
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iv. Congress Attempts to Stem the Tide 
 
[79]  Congress has also recognized the judiciary’s increasing reliance on 
foreign authority to guide constitutional interpretation and resolution of 
other domestic disputes. To curb this practice, on March 17, 2004, 
Representative Tom Feeney (R-FL) introduced House Resolution 568 into 
the 108th Congress.273  Representative Feeney explained that the 
“American people have not authorized through Congress or through a 
constitutional amendment the use of foreign laws to establish new law or 
deny rights here in the United States.”274 Co-Sponsor Bob Goodlatte (R-
VA) had this explanation to offer:  
 
Recently there has been a deeply disturbing trend in 
American juris-prudence.  The Supreme Court, the highest 
court in the land, has begun to look abroad, to international 
law instead of our own Constitution as the basis for its 
decisions.  In fact six of the Court’s nine justices have 
either written or joined opinions that cite foreign 
authorities.  This is an affront to both our national 
sovereignty and the broader democratic underpinnings of 
our system of government.  The introduction of this 
legislation comes at a critical time, for when judges and 
justices begin to operate outside the boundaries of the U.S. 
Constitution, Congress must respond.275 
 
House Resolution 568 declared that “judicial determinations regarding the 
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such 
foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of 
the original meaning of the laws of the United States.”276 
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 H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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[80]  On February 15, 2005, Feeney re-introduced into the 109th Congress 
the identical resolution as House Resolution 97.277  One month later, 
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced to the Senate the identical bill.278  
All three of these resolutions recognized that “[the] inappropriate judicial 
reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the 
sovereignty of the United States, the separation of powers and the 
President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority . . . .”279  
 
[81]  Other members of Congress have also attempted to curb the 
judiciary’s reliance on foreign authority. In the 108th Congress, 
Representatives Robert Aderholt (R-AL) and Mike Pence (R-IN), along 
with thirty-seven co-sponsors, introduced House Report 3799 entitled the 
“Constitution Restoration Act of 2004.”280  Senator Richard Shelby (D-
AL) introduced the same bill to the Senate.281  Title II, Section 201 of both 
bills stated:  
 
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United 
States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any 
constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, 
directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of 
any foreign state or international organization or agency, 
other than the constitutional law and English common 
law.282 
 
Unfortunately, neither an analytical framework nor a sustained dialogue 
regarding these important issues has been established.  These recent 
congressional attempts to mandate the judiciary’s strict adherence to 
American jurisprudence during its interpretation of the Constitution and 
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application of statutory law failed.  When the legislative term ended, each 
was eliminated from further congressional consideration. 
 
v. Maintaining the Separation of Powers 
 
[82]  Lastly, the framers explicitly balanced the distribution of power 
between the three branches of government.  When one branch oversteps 
the limits of its constitutional duties, the separation of powers is blurred.  
The actions of the greedy branch force another branch to cede some of its 
enumerated powers.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, any 
misuse of power, regardless of the magnitude of the infraction, must be 
voided immediately.  The idea behind a written constitution is that it forms 
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.  Over two centuries ago, 
Chief Justice Marshall explained “. . . there is no middle ground.  The 
constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, 
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”283  Any imbalance 
poses a threat to the very fiber of America’s constitutional republic. 
 
[83]  If the American judiciary interjects elements of foreign authorities 
into its decision making process without congressional guidance, then it 
risks overstepping the boundaries of its authority.  If Congress wants the 
judiciary to incorporate foreign authorities into its analysis of domestic 
issues, then it can establish a framework in which that analysis can 
proceed.  In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared, “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”284 The law to which he refers is undoubtedly the law of this 
country.  The American judiciary is equipped to determine the meaning of 
American law.  The same cannot be said of foreign law.  Until that time, 
the use of foreign authorities by the American judiciary to interpret 
American laws created by the American Congress is far too un-American 
a thought to entertain. 
 
[84]  The text of the Constitution must always be the starting part for any 
analysis regarding its interpretation and application.  Although foreign 
authority may provide the judiciary with a fresh perspective, adherence to 
                                                 
283
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
284
 Id.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 1 
 
 54
both American statutory law and common law is indispensable.  While the 
framers may have relied on English law to guide them, it was a pragmatic 
decision in light of the enormous task of drafting the document that 
birthed this nation.  Now, over two hundred years later, the United States 
is a strong and thriving world leader with volumes of judicial precedent, 
particularly relating to intellectual property law.  The judiciary need not 
rely on foreign authorities in either its constitutional or statutory 
interpretation, particularly if such reliance is utilized solely to pursue 
international harmonization of intellectual property laws.  
 
[85]  Adoption of the first-to-file system will disregard centuries of 
intellectual property jurisprudence and force the judiciary to incorporate 
the only available source of precedent – that of foreign countries.  This 
weakens the Constitution and threatens American interests.  If the United 
States is going to harmonize its intellectual property laws with those of 
other nations, then it must be the work of Congress and not the judiciary. 
 
PART VII. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
 
[86]  There is no shortage of proposals for patent reform.  These potential 
reforms are broad in scope and extensive in nature.  However, as described 
in the beginning of this article, if changes need to be made, then the coach 
of Team Patent must make the changes in a way that minimizes disruption 
to the team.  Following any changes in the lineup, an individual player 
must still be comfortable in the role he has been assigned.  Remember, the 
potential for success is optimized when the greatest number of players is 
comfortable.  
 
A. Experiment with Reform Within the First-to-Invent Framework 
 
[87]  If the cost of determining inventorship through an interference 
proceeding is truly too costly to the parties and to the PTO, then the 
answer does not exist in the first-to-file system.  Modifying rather than 
abandoning the current system will be much less disruptive to patent 
prosecution than the introduction of an entirely new system.  Rather, 
alternative means for resolving priorities disputes can be integrated into 
the current first-to-invent system.  Likewise, there are several aspects of 
the current patent process that can be tweaked slowly and steadily.  This 
type of reform is less unsettling to the patent community because it allows 
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the team to acclimate to the new rules with little disruption and at a less 
frenzied pace.  Many aspects of the patent process could benefit from a 
more bite-size approach to reform.  
 
[88]  Currently, when the application is rejected due to lack of novelty or 
when the application is challenged during an interference, the PTO 
presumes that the date of invention is the application’s filing date.  
Therefore, an applicant is only required to show an earlier conception 
date.  Rather than this wait-and-see approach towards priority, the PTO 
could require applicants to be more proactive in establishing their 
invention dates.  For example, the PTO could require applicants to submit 
corroborating proof which establishes the date of conception at the time of 
filing.  If an applicant were unable to provide tangible corroboration of an 
earlier invention date, then the PTO would unequivocally establish the 
application’s filing date as its invention date.  As soon as the applicant’s 
invention date is determined, another party may come forward and offer 
evidence of an earlier invention date.  So long as the evidence could be 
corroborated, the second party will win the priority dispute.  
 
[89]  Similarly, the PTO could also require that inventors maintain more 
comprehensive records.  A rule promulgated by the PTO would uniformly 
give notice to all practitioners, businesses, and inventors, and would 
encourage the contemporaneous acquisition of evidence corroborating 
conception, reduction to practice, and diligence. Even if inventors are 
forced to be more meticulous in keeping the necessary records to 
corroborate these inventive acts, any additional burden associated with 
these endeavors is well worth the avoidance of a traditional interference 
proceeding.  It is far easier to invest a little more time and effort in record 
keeping during the development of the invention than it is to reconstruct 
events, thoughts, impressions, and actions that occurred weeks, months, 
and perhaps years, earlier. 
 
[90]  Although these particular options are unlikely to be embraced, they 
are offered here solely to demonstrate that options other than the blind 
adoption of the first-to-file system are available. 
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B. Cultivate the Judiciary’s Expertise 
 
[91]  During the 109th Congress, Representatives Darrell Issa (R-CA) and 
Adam Schiff (D-CA) proposed an intriguing change to the patent process 
when they introduced House Report 5418.285  The bill establishes “a pilot 
program in certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement 
of expertise in patent cases among district judges.”286  According to Issa, 
the legislation is designed to help courts reduce the errors that lead to 
appeals.287 One week after the House passed House Report 5418, Senators 
Orin Hatch (R-UT) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) introduced an identical 
bill to the Senate.288  
 
[92]  Through the established pilot programs, judges in at least five district 
courts would have the choice to opt into hearing patent cases.289  Each of 
the test courts would be assigned a clerk with expertise in patent law or the 
technical issues arising in patent cases.290  Furthermore, those judges who 
opt into the program would receive funding for related educational 
opportunities.291  When a patent case is randomly assigned to a judge who 
has joined the program, that judge would keep the case.292  If a patent case 
is randomly assigned to a judge who has not joined the program, then that 
judge would have the choice of keeping the case or referring it to the 
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group of judges who have opted-in to the program.293  The proposed pilot 
program would last no longer than ten years and periodic studies would 
determine the project’s success.294 
 
[93]  What would motivate the proposal of such a pilot project?  “Patent 
cases are complex, difficult, time consuming and expensive.  Despite the 
nature of these cases, they are litigated before generalist judges and lay 
juries.”295  Representative Issa noted that the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals reverses roughly 40% of all patent case appeals.296  This high 
reversal rate of district court decisions in patent cases “undermines 
confidence in district court decision-making and the integrity of [the] legal 
system.”297 Issa remarked that “[p]rior to coming to Congress, I was part 
of a number of patent suits. I was often struck by the fact that many 
district court judges either knew little of the applicable law, or did not 
understand the technology involved.”298  This legislation, according to 
Representative Schiff, would “raise the level of expertise in patent 
litigation [and] improve the reliability of patents . . . .”299  On January 4, 
2007, Representatives Issa, Schiff, and Cohen (D-TN) reintroduced the 
bill as House Report 34 in the current 110th Congress.300  On February 12, 
2007, the House of Representatives passed House Report 34 by a voice 
vote.301  
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[94]  In many ways, the Eastern District of Texas is a microcosm of the 
system proposed by Issa’s bill.  The numbers speak for themselves.  Of the 
approximately 2700 patent cases filed annually, almost 10% of these cases 
are filed in the Eastern District of Texas.  Furthermore, over half of those 
cases are filed in small town of Marshall.  While patent cases normally 
take three to five years to be resolved elsewhere, they are typically 
resolved in about fourteen to eighteen months in Marshall.302  More 
remarkable is the fact that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has never 
reversed a decision by Marshall Judges Ward and Davis.303 
 
[95]  What makes Marshall unique?  First, Marshall’s judges have a 
background in trial practice in the Eastern District, a district where cases 
historically move quickly.304 Second, the Eastern District has a reputation 
as a good place to try cases because the courts “provided a firm trial 
setting, simplified and expedited discovery procedures, and judges who 
actively control their docket.”305  Third, Marshall implemented a set of 
local patent rules.  Introduced by Judge Ward in 1999, these patent rules 
advance cases through the initial stages of litigation, particularly the 
tedious claims construction portion of a patent case.306 
 
[96]  Marshall’s lesson is clear.  A dedicated, experienced, and 
knowledgeable court is part of the patent solution.  
 
C. Boost the PTO’s Budget 
 
[97]  The current American patent system appears to be improving.  The 
PTO, which for years has been under-funded, reported that FY 2006 was a 
record year in many respects.  First, FY 2006 represented only the second 
year in a row where the PTO had full use of its fee collections.307  
According to the PTO’s Performance and Accountability Report for FY 
2006, this infusion of funds “allowed the USPTO continued flexibility 
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towards meeting the goals . . . including . . . improving the quality of its 
services and products . . . [and] enabl[ing] the USPTO to substantially 
increase the number of examiners.”308  Second, recent increases in the 
number of examiners are providing positive results.  In FY 2006, patent 
examiners completed over 332,000 patent applications - the largest 
number ever - while concomitantly achieving the lowest patent allowance 
error rate in over twenty years (3.5%).309  Third, at 54%, the patent 
allowance rate was also the lowest on record.310  
 
[98]  Furthermore, on February 5, 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property Steve Pinkos announced that President 
Bush’s FY 2008 budget request for the PTO was 1.916 billion dollars.311  
This marks the fourth consecutive year that the President’s budget 
recommended that the PTO have full access to its anticipated fee 
collections.312  According to Pinkos, the budget request allows the PTO to 
“build on its recent successes in improving quality and increasing the 
number of patent and trademark examinations . . . [and] provides the 
resources to continue our record hiring of patent examiners . . . .”313  The 
PTO anticipates hiring an additional 1200 examiners in FY 2008.314  This 
is promising because the strength of issued patents turns on the efficiency 
of the patent process,315 and the efficiency of the patent process depends 
on a greater number of qualified examiners.  
 
[99]  Perhaps with a little more time and money, a major impetus behind 
widespread patent reform, the poor quality of patents, will correct itself.  
As Professor Jaffe explained, “[t]o put it crudely, if the patent office 
allows bad patents to issue, this encourages people with bad applications 
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to show up . . . Conversely, if the PTO pretty consistently rejected 
applications for bad patents, people would understand that bad 
applications are a waste of time and money.”316  With the lowest patent 
allowance rate on record and the lowest patent allowance error rate in two 
decades, as well as a pledge to hire an additional 1200 examiners this year 
alone, the PTO is serious about patent quality. 
 
D. Change the PTO’s Perspective on Examiner Compensation 
 
[100]  Old problems sometimes need fresh solutions.  During her 
testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Christine Siwik suggested that any reform effort should be directed at the 
PTO before introducing any major changes to the patent act.317  Siwik 
suggested that the current system for compensating patent examiners is 
counterproductive because it “rewards those who issue a large number of 
patents and punishes examiners who do not meet their production 
goals.”318  Siwik described the pressure on examiners to meet their count 
quotas as “substantial and constant.”319 Because it is a dangerous practice 
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to encourage examiners to issue patents to secure bonuses, she urged that a 
“focus on the quality, and not the quantity, of patents issued.”320  
 
E. Keep the Team’s Expectations Realistic 
 
[101]  It is also imperative to remember that a patent system so large and 
powerful is going to require constant supervision and maintenance.  As 
scholar Adam Jaffe explained, “[p]atent examination is never going to be 
perfect.  Examiners are human. More important, there is an essentially 
irreducible aspect of judgment in determining if an invention is truly 
new.”321  Because the patent system can never be perfect, the focus of any 
reform should not be the adoption of the first-to-file system, but rather on 
the development of “a system that functions reasonably well despite the 
issuance of some bad patents.”322  
 
PART VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
[102]  The adoption of a first-to-file patent system will cause irreparable 
harm to American innovation.  Despite its flaws, the current first-to-invent 
system is the one envisioned by the framers and enacted by the early 
Congresses.  The changes proposed by the first-to-file system would 
unravel over two hundred years of established jurisprudence, and would 
directly oppose the constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of 
the useful arts and sciences through awarding the patent to the first 
inventor.  The motivation to abandon the first-to-invent system stems from 
the perceived benefit of harmonizing international patent laws.  However, 
the adoption of the first-to-file system should only proceed if it is in the 
country’s best interest.  This paper demonstrates that it is not.  As one 
author noted, “[i]t makes no sense to eliminate an entire system in favor of 
a first-to-file system which ultimately costs everyone more and produces 
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worst patents, just because a first-to-file system is conceptually and 
bureaucratically a simple one.”323 
 
[103]  If global patent harmonization is inevitable, then the American 
government cannot jeopardize its superior position at the negotiation table.  
The American first-to-invent system provides the most powerful and 
desirable protection for intellectual property.324 That fierce sense of 
protection is born from the fact that inventorship and ownership are 
inextricably intertwined in this system.  The American system focuses on 
protecting the individual patentee by providing that patentee with the 
exclusive property rights to the invention.  The same cannot be said of 
some first-to-file systems such as Japan’s, where the patent system 
encourages the dissemination of technology in an effort to promote 
industrial development.325  Hence, adoption of the first-to-file system 
would remove inventorship from the innovation equation and align the 
American patent system with the weaker and less desirable patent systems 
of Japan and the European Patent Office. 
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[104]  The first-to-file system would foster a decrease in the quality of 
patents, an increase in the volume and costs of patent litigation, and would 
cause utter confusion as inventors, businesses, practitioners, the PTO, and 
the courts struggled to conform to the new system.  One only needs to 
envision the ensuing chaos if the United States implemented the “absolute 
novelty” provision associated with the first-to-file system, or the logistical 
nightmare of implementing prior users’ rights, and then administering 
those rights.  It is true that interference proceedings are expensive, 
laborious, and potentially risky undertakings.326  In the context of a 
priority dispute, however, they are inherently fairer. 327 
 
[105]  Because conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the first-to-
invent system provides Americans with something that has always 
distinguished this country from others - HOPE.  The proverbial “American 
Dream” is premised on opportunity, the opportunity to capitalize on one’s 
ingenuity, perseverance, and inspiration.  The first-to-invent system of 
awarding patent priority preserves that dream for American inventors. The 
system equalizes the playing field for those innovators who have large 
dreams but small pocketbooks.  If reform is imminent, then the first-to-file 
system should be the very last substitution made.  Since the first patent act 
was enacted, this nation has experienced great success under the first-to-
invent system.  As Chief Justice Roberts recently remarked, “a page of 
history is worth a volume of logic.”328  Simply stated, the abandonment of 
the first-to-invent patent system is not in this team’s best interest. 
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